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Introduction  
 
“They  are  looking  for  information  and  guidance  and  want  to  know  what  to  do.  They  are 
not  looking  for  rumors.”  This  was  part  of  reporter  Philip  Rucker’s  response  as  he  questioned  the 
report  done  by  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  which  suggested  the  new  coronavirus  could 
be  suppressed  by  heat  and  humidity.  Trump  replied:  “Hey  Phil,  I’m  the  president  and  you’re fake 
news.  And  you  know  what  I’ll  say  to  you?  I  know  you  well,  I  know  you  well.  Because  I  know  the 
guy,  I  see  what  he  writes.  He’s  a  total  faker .”  
In  the  same  press  conference,  Trump  was  asked  by  another  reporter  if  he  was  aware  of  the 
medical  status  of  Kim  Jong-un.  Trump  replied:  “I  think  the  report  was  incorrect.  I  think  the  report 
was  done  by  a  network  that  was  incorrect.  I'm  hearing  they  used  old  documents...I  hope  it  was  an 
incorrect  report.”  When  a  CNN  reporter  followed  up  asking  if  Trump  had  been  in  contact  with  the 
North  Koreans,  he  again  refused  to  answer,  spoke  on  the  strength  of  his  and  Kim’s  relationship, 
and  ended  with:  “I  think  it  was  a fake report,  done  by  CNN.”  The  same  CNN  reporter  responded 
with:  “But  can  I  ask  you  a  question?”  To  which  Trump  replied:  “No,  that’s  enough.”  The  same 
reporter  stated:  “But  that  wasn’t  my  question…”  Trump  responded:  “The  problem  is  you  don't 
write  the truth ,  you  know,  as  far  as  I  am  concerned  I  want  to  go  to  the  next  one.”  The  reporter 
continued  pressing  Trump,  asking  a  follow  up  question,  to  which  Trump  ended  by  saying:  “CNN 
is  fake  news,  don’t  talk  to  me.”   1
If  you  have  Twitter,  watch  or  read  the  news,  or  even  listen  to  a  conversation  on  the  street, 
you  would  know  that  a  tendency  has  developed  to  deem  particular facts ,  ideas,  people,  and 
1PBS  NewsHour,  WATCH:  White  House  coronavirus  task  force  gives  pandemic  update  --  April  23,  
2020  (YouTube:  April  23,  2020). 
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networks  as  “fake  news.”  What  I  find  most  interesting  about  this  is  not  just  the  compulsion  to  label 
something  as  “fake,”  but  the  underlying  commitment  to  truth,  certainty  and  the  skeptical  attitude 
that  this  proclamation  makes  clear.  While  one  surely  could  claim  something  “fake”  after  it  has  been 
submitted  to  substantial  questioning  and  investigation,  the  majority  of  “fake  news”  claims  lack 
substantiation  of  any  kind.  “Fake  news”  rhetoric  has  morphed  into  a  tool  that  can  be  implemented 
toward  ideas,  opinions  and  facts  that  one  personally,  not  objectively,  disagrees  with.  This  political 
declaration  of  truth-knowing  is  da ngerous  for  it  not  only  uncritically  assumes  a  position  of  absolute 
certainty,  but  it  also  precludes  conversation  and  debate  which  might  lead  toward  actual  certainty.  
While  the  prevalence  of  “fake  news”  might  appear  to  be  a  new  phenomenon,  it  actually 
speaks  to  an  important  relationship  between  skepticism  and  certainty  which  has  a  rich 
philosophical  history.  As  we  see  with  the  above  example,  this  relationship  -  and  its  political 
implications  -  is  one  that  still  haunts  us,  and  as  such,  demands  further  attention.  Does  a 
commitment  to  certainty  necessarily  call  for  a  skeptical  attitude?  What  are  the  political 
consequences  of  skepticism?  How  might  we  understand  traditional  political  positions  -  from 
revolutionary  politics  to  reformism,  liberalism  to  conservatism  -  as  motivated  by  the  quest  for 
certainty,  as  informed  by  a  skeptical  epistemology?  To  answer  these  questions,  I  turn  to  the  work  of 
René  Descartes,  Jean-Jacques  Rousseau,  and  Edmund  Burke.  
My  first  chapter  focuses  on  René  Descartes,  who  obliterates  the  old  way  of  approaching 
philosophy.  Instead  of  relying  on  the  learning  and  application  of  forms  to  understand  the  world,  he 
asserts  that  we  no  longer  need  prior  knowledge;  we  simply need  to enact  our  equal  capacity  to 
reason  through  using  our  mind.  Due  to  the  certainty  of  our  capacity  to  reason,  he  establishes  a 
method  which requires  skepticism  in  order  to  develop  certainty. His  method  while  demonstrating 
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the  importance  of  doubt,  still  forces  us  to  consider  what  certainty  means  both  individually  and 
collectively,  and  in  doing  so,  raises  many  political  questions.  I  argue  that  his  method  illuminates 
two  political  tendencies:  revolution  and  conservatism.  
In  my  second  chapter,  I  examine  Jean-Jacques  Rousseau  who  was  worshiped  like  a  God 
during  the  French  Revolution.  However,  through  investigating  his  work, I  suggest  that  a  tension 
emerges  between  the  content  of  his  ideas,  which  seem  to  be  revolutionary  through  and  through, 
and  their  implementation,  which  speaks  to  more  conservative  trends.  Ultimately,  I  argue  that  this 
tension  is  driven  by  two  different  motivations:  the  first  being  to  establish  equality  and  the  second 
being  the  productive  necessity  of  inequality. 
In  my  third  chapter,  I  investigate  Edmund  Burke,  who  is  considered  to  have  founded 
conservatism. I  claim  Burke’s  thought  is  often  simplified,  but  through  examining  his  skepticism,  we 
can  bring  forth  its  complexities. I  argue  that  Burke’s  skepticism  leads  him  to  rely  on  the  concept  of 
inheritance,  resulting  in  a  political  ideology  that  opposes  revolution,  but  still  prioritizes  reform.  As 
such,  I  argue  that he  is  fundamentally  interested  in  the  question  of  change  and  that  his criticism  of 
the  French  Revolution  had  little  to  do  with  the  changes  they  wished  to  implement,  but  had 
everything  to  do  with  the  manner  in  which  it  was  done. 
Throughout  this  project,  I  aim  to  show  that  the  relationship  between  skepticism  and 
certainty  is  a  philosophically  prosperous  one.  Not  only  does  it  bring  attention  to  the  complexity  of 
these  thinkers  and  the  nuance  of  their  political  positions,  but  it  also  reveals  that  skepticism  is  a 
narrative  in  progress  which  brings  forth  vastly  different  political  outcomes  and  questions.  
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1 
Descartes’  Politics:  From  the  Individual  to  the  Collective 
 
Prior  to  Descartes,  the  dominant  epistemological  school  of  thought  was  the  Aristotelian 
school.  It  was  thought  that  an  individual  was  only  able  to  make  sense  of  the  world  around  them  2
through  the  application  of  set  principles,  that  is,  until  Descartes.  He  found  this  approach  of 
understanding  to  be  utterly  problematic,  for  it  carried  a  tremendous  capacity  to  bring  about  false 
certainties.  So,  instead  of  adhering  to  these  false  principles,  Descartes  took  it  upon  himself  to 
discover  a  new  way  in  which  we  can  know  with  absolute  certainty.  A  feat  in  which  he 
accomplished: 
And  after  having  thus  reconstructed  the  edifice  which  it  pleased  him  to  pull  down, 
he  will  loudly  and  boldly  declare  it  indestructible.  Doubt  no  more  in  God,  nor  the 
soul,  nor  the  real  world;  Descartes  has  found  the  principle  of  certainty,  and  the 
notions  he  has  deduced  from  it  he  now  assures  us  are  as  certain  as  geometrical 
theorems.  He  has  abandoned  doubt;  but  he  has  exhausted,  he  has  conquered  it;  he 
has  seized  upon  the  right  of  examination  for  his  own  use,  but  he  has  disarmed  it. 
For  a  moment  a  revolutionist  in  philosophy,  he  appears  to  have  had  the  pretension 
to  close  the  gate  on  revolutions  for  ever.  Yesterday  he  doubts,  to-day  he  imposes 
himself.  3
 
Descartes  “found  the  principle  of  certainty”  through  having  “exhausted”  and  “conquered”  doubt. 
He  declares  that  certainty  is  a  direct  function  of  the  mind,  and  that  through  the  utilization  of  reason 
alone,  we  can  decipher  the  world  around  us.  He  is  so  sure  of  his  new  edifice,  that  the  man  who 
once  doubted  everything,  doubts  no  longer,  and  instead  “imposes  himself.”  
2Joseph  Pitt,  "Problematics  in  the  History  of  Philosophy,"  Synthese  92,  no.  1  (1992),  123. 
3  Louis  Blanc,  History  of  the  French  Revolution  of  1789,  Vol.  1  (Philadelphia:  Lea  & 
Blanchard,1848),  217. 
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Despite  Descartes’  assertion  of  certainty,  he  received  tremendous  criticism  for  his  new 
approach.  Some  questioned  his  indoctrination  of  God,  claiming  that  his  method  was  created  solely  4
to  prove  the  existence  of  God.  Alternatively,  Descartes  was  also  called  an  atheist  because  he  dared 
to  question  God’s  existence  altogether.  Figures  such  as  David  Hume  argued  that  Descartes’  focus 
on  the  cogito  was  wrong,  and  that  the  senses  and  the  body  are  important  and  should  not  be  so 
easily  dismissed.  Descartes’  ideas  regarding  space  and  time  were  also  scrutinized  and  later  5
disproved  by  Sir  Isaac  Newton  through  his  discovery  of  gravity,  but  it  should  be  noted  that  he 
spent  considerable  energy  in  order  to  disprove  Descartes.   6
Despite  Descartes’  critics,  his  work  demonstrates  the  importance  of  doubt  and  still  forces  us 
to  consider  what  certainty  means  both  individually  and  collectively,  and  in  doing  so,  raises  many 
political  questions.  I  argue  that  his  method  -  one  which  requires  skepticism  aimed  at  the 
development  of  certainty  -  illuminates  two  political  tendencies:  revolution  and  conservatism.  
He  boldly  begins  his Discourse  on  Method  by  stating  all  men  are  inherently  equal  in  their 
ability  to  reason:  
Rather,  it  provides  evidence  that  the  power  of  judging  well  and  of  distinguishing  the 
true  from  the  false  (which  is,  properly  speaking,  what  people  call  “good  sense”  or 
“reason”)  is  naturally  equal  in  all  men,  and  that  the  diversity  of  our  opinions  does 
not  arise  from  the  fact  that  some  people  are  more  reasonable  than  others,  but  solely 
from  the  fact  that  we  lead  our  thoughts  along  different  paths  and  do  not  take  the 
same  things  into  consideration.  7
 
4Descartes  et  al.,  The  Harvard  Classics ,  vol.  34:  French  and  English  Philosophers  (Descartes, 
Rousseau,  Voltaire,  Hobbes),  ed.  Charles  William  Eliot,  (P.  F.  Collier  &  Son,  1910),  115. 
5  Pitt,  “Problematics,”  125-126. 
6Andrew  Janiak,   "Newton’s  Philosophy",  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  ed.  Edward 
Zalta  (Metaphysics  Research  Lab:  Stanford  University,  Winter  2019),  section  3.  
7René  Descartes ,  Discourse  on  Method  and  Meditations  on  First  Philosophy  (Fourth  Edition), 
trans.  Donald  Cress  (Indianapolis;  Cambridge:  Hackett,  1998),  1. 
Rosenthal  6 
While  this  diversity  of  thought  had  been  considered  to  reflect  an  inherent  unequal  ability  to  reason, 
Descartes  claims  it  reflects  the  opposite.  Due  to  our  equal  capacity  to  reason,  he  argues  that  we 
arrive  at  different  conclusions  “solely”  because  we  do  not  take  “the  same  things  into 
consideration.”  Had  we  followed  the  same  “paths,”  we  would  arrive  at  the  same  end. 
Diversity  of  thought,  while  reflecting  an  equal  capacity  to  reason,  also  forced  Descartes  to 
investigate  what  it  means  to  be  certain:  
I  noticed  there  was  about  as  much  diversity  as  I  had  previously  found  among  the 
opinions  of  philosophers.  Thus  the  greatest  profit  I  derived  from  this  was  that,  on 
seeing  many  things  that,  although  they  seem  to  us  very  extravagant  and  ridiculous, 
do  not  cease  to  be  commonly  accepted  and  approved  among  other  great  peoples,  I 
learned  not  to  believe  anything  too  firmly  of  which  I  had  been  persuaded  only  be 
example  and  custom;  and  this  I  little  by  little  freed  myself  from  many  errors  that  can 
darken  our  natural  light  and  render  us  less  able  to  listen  to  reason.  8
 
Through  travel,  he  realized  that  many  things  he  would  find  to  be  peculiar  in  one  place  would  be 
“accepted  and  approved”  in  another.  Witnessing  diversity  -  the  rejection  of  one  practice  or  custom 
here,  but  the  acceptance  of  that  same  practice  or  custom  there  -  forced  Descartes  to  question  what 
he  had  previously  accepted  to  be  true.  Diversity  revealed  the  blind  acceptance  of  culturally  relative 
ideas  and  customs,  which  he  himself  fell  victim  to  by  virtue  of  living  in  society.  Traveling  outside 
of  his  country  forced  him  to  recognize  this  diversity  which,  in  turn,  directed  him  to  question  his 
own  beliefs:  “I  learned  not  to  believe  anything  too  firmly  of  which  I  had  been  persuaded  only  by 
example  and  custom.”  This  self-driven  reflection  is  a  direct  result  of  the  recognition  of  diversity 
through  experience.  Experience  taught  him  to  be  skeptical  in  order  to  cast  aside  the  errors  he 
accumulated  while  living  and  learning  in  society.  
8René  Descartes ,  Discourse,  6. 
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Experience  offers  significant  insight  because  it  reveals  the  lack  of  concrete  truths  while 
highlighting  what  is  not  known.  However,  if  experience  reveals  so  much,  how  is  it  that  Descartes 
can  then  claim  that  “studying  within  [himself]”  (solitude),  proved  to  be  much  more  successful 
“than  had  [he]  never  left  either  [his]  country  or  [his]  books.”  This  feeling  of  having  greater  success  9
through  solitude  speaks  to  the  confusion  Descartes  discovered  in  the  world.  Diversity  of  opinion 
clouds  the  use  of  one's  reason.  Solitude  contains  freedom  from  society,  and  by  virtue,  freedom 
from  confusion.  If  we  conceptualize  Descartes  in  this  way,  the  significance  of  solitude  is  evident  - 
solitude  is  where  the  individual  can  “spend  all  the  power  of  [their]  mind  in  choosing  the  paths  that 
[they]  should  follow.”  Solitude  is  where  the  individual  can  fully  harness  their  reason  to  10
investigate  what  can  be  certain  for  them.  As  such,  we  can  now  see  how  experience  and  solitude 
operate  for  Descartes,  and  that  there  is  a  necessity  for  both  in  the  investigative  process  of  certainty. 
With  this  established,  we  can  return  to  a  driving  question  Descartes  has  regarding  the  use  of 
individual  reason:  How  can  everyone  be  taught  to  use  their  reason?  To  this,  Descartes  creates  his 
method.  
His  method  involves  four  rules.  The  first  is  “to  take  nothing  as  true  that  is  not  already  11
plainly  known  as  such,”  and  “avoid  hasty  judgments  and  prejudices.”  What  does  he  mean  here?  To 
“take  nothing  as  true  that  is  not  already  plainly  known  as  such”  tends  toward  basic  rules, 
particularly  involving  mathematics.  For  example,  two  plus  two  equals  four  is  a  plain  truth.  The 
avoiding  of  “hasty  judgments  and  prejudices”  is  reflective  of  Descartes’  desire  to  undo  all  prior 
opinions  he  held  so  that  he  can  re-establish  what  is  certain.  It  also  highlights  how  the  process  of 
9René  Descartes ,  Discourse,  6. 
10René  Descartes ,  Discourse,  6. 
11René  Descartes ,  Discourse,  11. 
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discovering  what  can  be  true  is  in  fact  a  process  and  investigation;  it  requires  forgetting  what  one 
already  knows  and  beginning  anew.  
The  second  rule  is  to  divide  all  of  the  difficulties  found  within  a  particular  claim  in  order  to 
be  better  able  to  resolve  the  issues.  What  is  meant  by  this  rule  is  expressed  through  an  example  in 
his Meditations .  He  writes  about  a  person  having  a  basket  full  of  apples  who  is  worried  that  some  12
of  the  apples  are  rotten.  In  this  case,  the  person  needs  to  empty  out  all  the  apples  and  investigate 
each  apple  to  assure  it  is  free  of  rot  before  returning  it  to  the  basket.  This  same  principle  is  found 
within  his  second  rule  -  divide  up  what  is  uncertain  and  then  investigate  each  claim  until  it  is  found 
to  be  certain. The  third  rule  is  to  conduct  thoughts  in  an  orderly  fashion,  starting  with  what  is  
already  known  or  simplest  to  know,  so  that  one  can  “ascend  little  by  little,  as  by  degrees,  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  most  composite  things.”  The  fourth  and  last  rule,  is  to  be  thorough  so  that 
nothing  has  been  omitted.  This  requires  exploring  every  path  before  reaching  a  conclusion.  
When  following  Descartes’  method,  an  individual  is  compelled  to  use  their  reason  to 
establish  what  is  certain.  The  significance  of  this  method  lies  not  only  in  its  comprehensibility,  but 
that  it  reflects  the  individual’s  agency  when  deciding  what  is  certain.  This  agency  emerges  as  a 
theme  in  Part  One  of  his Discourse .  His  declaration  of  equal  ability  to  reason  calls  forth  any  person 
to  investigate  their  beliefs  and  customs.  As  such,  he  is  teaching  a  universal  method,  one  that 
operates  outside  the  confines  of  social  class,  education  and  wealth.  This  conceptually  provides 
limitless  power  to  the  individual  and  how  they  understand  the  world  around  them.  The  individual 
is  free  to  question,  explore,  and  investigate,  while  needing  nothing  more  than  their  mind  to  do  so.  It 
12Newman,  Lex,  "Descartes’  Epistemology",  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  ed.  Edward 
Zalta  (Metaphysics  Research  Lab:  Stanford  University,  Spring  2019),  section  2.2.  
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is  clear  that  a  new  wave  of  agency  and  critical  thought  emerges  from  the  beginning  of  Descartes’ 
Discourse .  
One  might  now  assume  that  this  individual  call  to  be  skeptical  would  immediately  translate 
into  rebellion  and  revolution,  but  instead,  Descartes  suggests  the  very  opposite.  In  Part  Two  of  his 
Discourse ,  a  hesitancy  to  make  change  within  the  political  and  social  sphere  appears.  Through  a 
reference  to  Sparta,  he  begins  to  discuss  the  importance  of  order  and  the  acceptance  of  authority:  
And,  speaking  of  things  human,  I  believe  that  if  Sparta  was  at  one  time  very 
flourishing,  this  was  not  because  of  the  goodness  of  each  one  of  its  laws  taken  by 
itself,  seeing  that  many  of  them  were  very  strange  and  even  contrary  to  good 
morals,  but  because,  having  been  devised  by  a  single  individual,  they  all  tended 
toward  the  same  end.  13
 
The  “flourishing”  of  Sparta  is  because  every  individual  “tended  toward  the  same  end.''  But  what 
does  “flourishing”  mean  in  this  context?  Based  on  what  is  known  about  Sparta,  this  is  reflective  of 
the  state’s  power,  specifically  its  military  power  and  the  loyalty  of  its  citizens.  He  also  notes  that 
many  of  the  laws  “were  very  strange  and  even  contrary  to  good  morals,”  but  this  appears  to  be  of 
little  relevance  to  him.  What  is  relevant  is  that  each  citizen  was  obedient  and  that  the  city-state  was 
able  to  prosper.  Furthermore,  it  is  significant  to  realize  that  the  importance  of  individual  reason 
exists  within  this  example  too;  however,  it  takes  on  a  different  role.  The  laws  “having  been  devised 
by  a  single  individual”  create  a  cohesiveness  “toward  the  same  end.''  Politically,  only  one 
individual  can  act  while  the  rest  must  follow.  As  such,  the  individual  must  keep  their  pursuit  of 
certainty  to  themselves  and  obey  laws  and  customs  so  the  state  can  function.  
If  the  separation  between  the  individual  and  the  collective  was  not  already  made  clear  with 
the  Sparta  example,  he  then  explicitly  writes  about  it  in  relation  to  political  and  social  matters: 
13René  Descartes ,  Discourse,  7. 
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This  is  why  I  could  in  no  way  approve  of  those  troublemaking  and  restless 
personalities  who,  called  neither  by  their  birth  nor  by  their  fortune  to  manage  public 
affairs,  are  forever  coming  up  with  an  idea  for  some  new  reform  in  this  matter.   14
 
He  affirms  the  need  for  authority  by  claiming  that  those  who  are  to  “manage  public  affairs”  are 
strictly  people  who  are  born  into  the  position  or  are  brought  to  that  position  by  fortune.  To  those 
who  do  not  occupy  a  political  position  of  power  but  express  ideas  of  reform,  he  is  critical  of  them 
and  labels  them  “troublemaking  and  restless  personalities.”  This  critique,  based  off  of  his  Sparta 
example,  is  linked  to  the  continuous  production  of  new  ideas  of  reform  which  disrupt  the  social 
order  because  they  are  not  created  by  the  sole  person  in  power.  The  introduction  of  new  ideas 
creates  variability  within  a  particular  society  which  would  not  orient  everyone  towards  the  same 
ends,  and  thus,  would  hinder  the  state’s  ability  to  prosper.  Again,  we  see  the  separation  Descartes  is 
establishing  between  the  individual  and  the  collective.  
At  this  point,  we  might  ask:  Why  is  it  that  once  we  move  into  public  affairs,  the  individual’s 
agency  loses  its  relevance  and  significance  for  Descartes?  This  question  calls  us  to  return  to 
Descartes’  original  focus  on  the  individual  establishment  of  certainty.  We  already  saw  that  his 
method  requires  doubting  until  one  is  absolutely  certain,  and  so,  this  desire  for  absolute  certainty 
appears  to  also  result  in  a  nervousness  to  disrupt  anything  outside  of  the  individual’s  thoughts 
before  they  are  certain.  He  writes:  “These  great  bodies  are  too  difficult  to  raise  up  once  they  have 
been  knocked  down,  or  even  to  hold  up  once  they  have  been  shaken;  and  their  fall  can  only  be 
very  violent.”  He  is  hesitant  about  disrupting  “these  great  bodies”  in  any  capacity  because  he  15
recognizes  that  once  they  are  knocked  down  or  shaken,  they  will  not  be  able  to  be  put  back  up. 
14René  Descartes ,  Discourse,  9 . 
15René  Descartes ,  Discourse,  8 . 
Rosenthal  11 
The  moment  these  bodies  are  disrupted,  society  would  lose  the  very  thing  that  has  grounded  them, 
hence  why  he  is  critical  of  those  who  attempt  to  constantly  put  forth  ideas  of  reform.  
As  this  passage  continues,  we  see  how  deeply  his  nervousness  affects  even  his  original 
views:  
Moreover,  as  to  their  imperfections,  if  they  have  any  (and  the  mere  fact  of  the 
diversity  that  exists  among  them  suffices  to  assure  one  that  many  do  have 
imperfections),  custom  has  doubtless  greatly  mitigated  them  and  even  prevented 
imperceptibly  corrected  many  of  them,  against  which  prudence  could  not  provide 
so  well.   16
 
His  anxiety  regarding  the  use  of  individual  skepticism  against  social  and  political  orders  leads  him 
to  dismiss  the  very  imperfections  which  he  initially  took  fault  with.  He  further  claims  that  “custom 
has  doubtless  greatly  mitigated”  these  imperfections  and  has  even  corrected  many  such 
imperfections.  Was  it  not  this  same  diversity  in  custom  and  these  imperfections  which  lead  him  to 
establish  a  method  in  the  first  place?  He  continues: 
And  finally,  these  imperfections  are  almost  always  more  tolerable  than  changing 
them  would  be;  similarly,  the  great  roads  that  wind  through  mountains  little  by  little 
become  so  smooth  and  so  convenient  by  dint  of  being  frequently  used,  that  it  is 
much  better  to  follow  them  than  to  try  to  take  a  more  direct  route  by  climbing  over 
rocks  and  descending  to  the  bottom  of  precipices.  17
 
The  fear  of  not  having  order  due  to  acting  on  false  certainties  forces  him  to  further  dismiss  these 
imperfections  all  together  by  claiming  that  they  are  “almost  always  more  tolerable  than  changing 
them  would  be.”  He  uses  the  imagery  of  roads  winding  through  a  mountain  to  reflect  the  need  to 
act  in  a  way  that  maintains  the  existing  order.  The  “great  roads,”  meaning  the  current  systems 
which  rule  society,  are  made  “smooth  and  so  convenient  by  dint  of  being  frequently  used,  that  it  is 
much  better  to  follow  them  than  to  try  to  take  a  more  direct  route.”  This  call  for  social  obedience 
16René  Descartes ,  Discourse,  8 . 
17René  Descartes ,  Discourse,  8 . 
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furthers  the  gap  between  the  individual’s  skepticism  and  its  utility  with  society.  Descartes 
concludes  the  above  passage  by  claiming  that  if  we  “try  to  take  a  more  direct  route  by  climbing 
over  rocks”  we  will  fall  and  end  up  at  “the  bottom  of  precipices.”  This  again  reflects  his  obligation 
to  certainty,  particularly  toward  political  and  social  change.  Reform  requires  a  skepticism  that  is 
precise  and  results  in  complete  certainty  before  taking  action.  Until  this  certainty  is  established, 
everything  else  must  be  maintained  because  if  we  “try  to  take  a  more  direct  route,”  we  risk  our 
downfall. 
Through  this  analysis  of  Descartes,  we  are  able  to  consider  the  implications  of  shifting 
away  from  what  is  considered  certain,  the  connection  between  certainty  and  skepticism,  and  how 
the  same  depositing  of  certainty  affects  the  individual  within  different  contexts.  Descartes 
establishes  that  the  only  thing  he  is  certain  about  is  an  individual’s  capacity  to  reason.  Before  his 
method,  certainty  was  established  by  what  was  taught  and  customary.  His  method  subsequently 
removes  the  ability  to  blindly  accept  particular  ideas  and  practices  as  certain  because  certainty  is 
now  the  result  of  an  individual's  pursuit  of  it  through  the  process  of  doubt.  As  such,  people  must 
think  critically  about  themselves  and  their  external  world  in  order  to  know  anything  concretely. 
This  skeptical  thought  is  powerful  because  it  reveals  not  only  what  is  arbitrary  within  society,  but 
also  that  the  individual  chooses  what  paths  to  take,  what  to  believe,  and  what  to  accept.  
Descartes’  method  wakes  one  up  to  their  potential,  the  desire  for  certainty  motivates  them, 
and  skepticism  keeps  them  awake.  Conceptualizing  certainty  and  skepticism  in  this  way  reveals  its 
revolutionary  implications.  There  can  no  longer  be  a  blind  obedience  and  acceptance  of  laws  and 
customs.  People  are  now  aware  and  thinking  which  is  dangerous  politically  and  socially  because 
order  and  custom  now  depend  on  one  choosing  to  maintain  it.  However,  while  there  is  this 
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awakening  of  the  individual,  we  must  also  recognize  that  it  is  followed  by  an  assertion  of  authority 
and  order.  
Descartes’  prioritization  of  individual  reason  forces  one  to  act  with  whatever  the  custom  or 
law  is  because  it  creates  an  environment  which  is  orderly,  and  thus  conducive  to  the  individual's 
search  for  certainty.  Returning  to  his  example  of  Sparta,  the  rationale  as  to  why  it  thrived  was 
because  of  their  maintenance  of  structure  through  law.  With  everyone  following  the  same  path 
socially  and  politically,  there  was  cohesion,  security,  order  and  the  preservation  of  the  state.  As 
such,  the  freedoms  one  sacrifices  through  obeying  custom  and  law  are  thought  to  be  mitigated 
because  in  the  end,  the  individual  is  able  to  pursue  what  is  certain.  Furthermore,  because  laws  are 
devised  from  one  person,  obedience  to  these  laws  orients  the  collective  toward  the  same  end  which 
results  in  the  further  efficiency  of  the  state  and  avoids  disarray.  The  maintenance  of  order  through 
this  top  down  model  of  governing  also  allows  political  certainty  to  be  realized  by  those  in  power, 
and  thus  allows  for  these  certainties  to  be  implemented  into  law.  As  such,  we  see  that  the  need  for 
the  individual  to  obey  is  not  just  necessary  for  the  individual's  sake,  but  also  for  the  discovery  of 
political  and  social  certainty  as  well.  
However,  the  framing  of  obedience  as  a  necessary  component  for  the  individual  and  the 
political  pursuit  of  certainty  disguises  the  serious  implications  of  this  model.  By  placing  emphasis 
on  the  individual's  quest  for  certainty,  the  ability  for  the  individual  to  act  or  voice  anything  outside 
of  law  or  custom  becomes  problematic.  We  see  that  the  potential  threat  for  social  and  political 
disunity  as  a  result  of  individual  action  forces  restrictions  on  individual  freedom.  Furthermore,  this 
framing  of  obedience  to  law  and  custom,  paired  with  the  exclusion  of  individual  agency,  also 
results  in  the  consolidation  of  political  and  social  agency  to  those  already  in  a  position  of  authority. 
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This  conception  of  the  process  of  certainty  acts  as  a  counter  to  the  revolutionary  agency  established 
earlier.  
Additionally,  while  we  saw  that  the  adoption  of  a  skeptical  attitude  results  in  an  awakening 
of  the  individual,  politically  this  skepticism  results  in  disapproval  towards  immediate  change.  The 
importance  of  skepticism  and  certainty  are  amplified  within  the  political  and  social  sphere  because 
a  mistake  in  what  is  certain  could  risk  the  very  preservation  of  the  state.  Therefore,  one  needs  to  be 
absolutely  certain  before  acting  and  by  virtue  of  this  need  for  absolutism,  change  must  be  a  slow 
and  sure  process.  Furthermore,  with  the  omittance  of  the  individual’s  voice  within  the  political 
sphere,  this  assumes  doubt  over  who  is  able  to  reason.  This  hierarchical  approach  regarding  whose 
certainty  matters  not  only  emerges  as  a  result  of  Descartes’  political  skepticism,  but  also  serves  to 
challenge  his  original  claim  of  an  equal  capacity  to  reason.  
Through  tracking  the  role  of  certainty  and  skepticism  in  Descartes’ Discourse  on  Method , 
we  see  two  inclinations  appear:  one  toward  revolution  and  one  toward  conservatism.  While  his 
method  propels  an  individual  to  discover  what  can  be  certain  for  them,  the  expression  of  their 
findings  is  limited.  The  moment  we  enter  into  society,  we  are  expected  to  obey  laws,  custom,  and 
authority  because  the  risk  of  dismantling  the  social  order  from  the  assertion  of  false  certainty 
overrides  the  value  of  voicing  any  new,  and  perhaps  uncertain,  ideas  at  all.  Certainty,  which  is  the 
establishment  of  something  beyond  doubt,  creating  these  polar  opposite  movements  is  striking. 
This  vast  difference  forces  us  to  reconsider  how  certainty  and  skepticism  operate,  what  they  reveal, 
and  under  what  conditions  they  can  be  useful.  
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2 
Rousseau's  Certainty:  Equality  in  Theory  and  Practice 
 
If  Jean-Jacques  Rousseau’s  involvement  in  politics  is  unquestioned,  his  reception  and 
influence  is  as  mixed  as  it  is  extensive;  he  has  indeed  been  constructed  as  both  an  enemy  and 
protector  of  liberty.  Figures  such  as  Jacques  Pierre  Brissot,  who  led  the  Girondins  during  the 
French  Revolution,  disliked  Rousseau  and  his  relatively  anti-universalist  principles.  Likewise, 
Baron  d’Holbach,  another  philosopher  who  took  his  influence  from  Denis  Diderot, especially  took 
notice  of  Rousseau's  indoctrination  of  the  “Spartan  martial  spirit”  and  the  “narrow  chauvinism 
[Rousseau’s]  thought  appeared  to  encourage.”  However,  after  the  fall  of  Bastille  in  July  of  1789, 
Honoré  Gabriel  Riqueti,  comte  de  Mirabeau,  who  was  a  leader  in  the  beginning  of  the  French 
Revolution,  praised  Rousseau  “for  his  central  role  in  preparing  the  Revolution,”  writing  that  “never 
should  one  speak  of  liberty  and  the  Revolution  without  paying  homage  to  this  immortal  ‘vengeur 
de  la  nature  humaine’.”  Unsurprisingly,  while  Rousseau’s  position  within  academic  circles  was  18
ambiguous,  he  otherwise  was  “the  unrivaled  chief  teacher  and  prophet  venerated  by  revolutionary 
popular  culture.”  During  the  one  year  anniversary  of  Bastille's  fall,  a  parade  commenced  and  the 
Place  de  la  Bastille  was  decorated  with  garlands  and  revolutionary  symbols.  A  large  bust  of 
Rousseau,  with  a  civic  crown  on  its  head,  was  “carried  in  triumph  around  the  ruins”  while  the 
crowd  sung  “a  specially  composed  hymn  summoning  all  to  invoke  the  ‘holy  name  of  Rousseau, 
this  sublime  name’.”   19
18Jonathan  Israel,  Revolutionary  Ideas:  An  Intellectual  History  of  the  French  Revolution  from  The 
Rights  of  Man  to  Robespierre  (United  Kingdom:  Princeton  University  Press,  2014),  21.  
19Jonathan  Israel,  Revolutionary  Ideas ,  130-131. 
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While  it  was  the  range  of  Rousseau’s  reception  which  initially  provoked  my  interest,  I 
became  increasingly  curious  to  explore  how  his  work  could  give  rise  to  such  a  spectrum  of  political 
positions.  Through  a  close  reading  of The  Social  Contract ,  I  will  suggest  that  this  reception  is  a 
result  of  a  tension  between  the  content  of  Rousseau’s  ideas,  which  seem  to  be  revolutionary 
through  and  through,  and  their  implementation,  which  speaks  to  more  conservative  trends. 
Ultimately  in  this  chapter,  I  aim  to  highlight  that  the  tension  between  potentiality  and  actuality  is 
driven  by  two  different  motivations  -  the  first,  to  establish  equality  and  the  second,  the  productive 
necessity  of  inequality.  Alongside  these  motivations,  I  will  point  to  the  idea  of  transparency,  being 
that  it  is  central  for  Rousseau  in  his  understanding  of  the  transition  from  the  state  of  nature  to  that  of 
society.  
In  The  First  Discourse:  Discourse  on  the  Sciences  and  Arts  Rousseau  writes: 
In  truth,  human  nature  was  no  better  than  now,  but  people  found  security  in  the  ease 
with  which  they  could  see  through  one  another,  and  this  advantage,  of  which  we  no 
longer  appreciate  the  value,  saved  them  from  many  vices.  20
 
We  see  that  a  sense  of  certainty  develops  from  the  ease  of  being  able  to  see  through  one  another, 
and  it  is  precisely  this  loss  of  certainty  from  transparency  that  has  catastrophic  effects: 
What  a  parade  of  ills  accompany  this  uncertainty!  No  more  sincere  friendships,  no 
more  real  regard  for  another,  no  more  deep  trust.  Suspicions,  resentments,  fears, 
coldness,  reserve,  hatred,  and  betrayal  habitually  hide  under  that  uniform  and 
perfidious  veil  of  politeness,  under  that  lauded  sophistication  which  we  owe  to  the 
enlightenment  of  our  century.  21
 
Without  the  certainty  of  transparency,  we  find  ourselves  in  an  abysmal  state-no  way  to  know 
ourselves,  no  way  to  know  others  and  no  trust  or  unity.  We  instead  are  now  suspicious,  resentful, 
20Jean-Jacques  Rousseau,   The  Social  Contract  and  The  First  and  Second  Discourses ,  ed.  Susan 
Dunn  et  al  (New  Haven;  London:  Yale  University  Press,  2002),  49. 
21Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  50.  
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reserved  but  “habitually  hide  under  that  uniform  and  perfidious  veil  of  politeness.”  Uncertainty 
breeds  not  only  uniformity  because  people  are  afraid  to  be  themselves,  but  it  also  breeds  a  fear  of 
others.  We  have  no  ability  to  form  sincere  connections  with  people  and  operate  only  within  the 
superficial  “veil  of  politeness.”  Thus,  we  are  all  chained  and  perpetuate  the  same  system  that  is 
ruining  humankind.  As  we  can  see,  certainty  as  established  through  transparency  is  paramount  in 
understanding  not  only  what  is  lost  in  society  but  also  in  understanding  Rousseau’s  politics  in The 
Social  Contract .  
 If  we  begin  by  looking  at  the  opening  lines  of The  Social  Contract, we  are  able  to  get  an 
idea  of  what  Rousseau  aims  to  do  politically: 
My  purpose  is  to  consider if ,  in  political  society,  there  can  be  any  legitimate  and 
sure  principle  of  government,  taking  men  as  they  are  and  laws  as  they  might  be.  22
 
These  lines  highlight  exactly  what  Rousseau  strikes  to  be  certain  about,  namely if  there  can  be  “any 
legitimate  and  sure  principle  of  government.”  However,  what  is  notable  about  this  opening  is  that 
this  investigation  is  anchored  by  his  underlying  certainty  of  what  men  are.  For  my  purposes  in 
grappling  with  Rousseau’s  political  ideas,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  discover  what,  for  him, 
constitutes  the  nature  of  man.  This  explanation  lies  partially  in  his  understanding  of  the  state  of 
nature  to  civil  society,  a  progression  where  transparency,  equality  and  inequality  come  together.  
Rousseau’s  vision  of  the  state  of  nature  is  in  many  ways  a  response  to  Hobbes;  the  latter 
wrote  that  it  is  “solitary,  poore,  nasty,  brutish,  and  short.”  Rousseau,  in  his  essay Discourse  on  the  23
Origin  and  the  Foundations  of  Inequality  Among  Mankind , argues  that  the  state  of  nature  is  where 
22Jean-Jacques  Rousseau,  The  Social  Contract,  trans.  by  Maurice  Cranston  (New  York:  
Penguin  Classics,  1968),  49. 
23Thomas  Hobbes,  Leviathan:  Or  the  Matter,  Forme  &  Power  of  a  CommonWealth,  Ecclesiasticall 
and  Civill ,  ed.  by  A.R.  Waller  (Cambridge:  University  Press,  1904)  84. 
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humans  thrive  and  are  complete.  It  is  there  that  individuals,  driven  by  passion  rather  than  the 
constraints  of  learned  culture,-are  most  like  themselves-simple  and  complete.  Rousseau  writes: 
I  see  him  satisfying  his  hunger  under  an  oak,  and  his  thirst  at  the  first  brook;  I  see 
him  laying  himself  down  to  sleep  at  the  foot  of  the  same  tree  that  afforded  him  his 
meal;  and  there  are  all  his  wants  completely  supplied.  24
 
Within  this  primitive  picture,  the  individual  is  self-sufficient  and  able  to  be  so  because  the  passions 
remain  centered  around  basic  survival.  For  Rousseau,  these  notions  of  basic  survival  do  not  always 
equate  to  a  life  of  solitude  because  the  passions  occasionally  drive  the  individual  to  interact  with 
another  of  their  species:  
Hunger  and  other  appetites  made  him  at  different  times  experience  different  modes 
of  existence;  one  of  these  excited  him  to  perpetuate  his  species;  and  this  blind 
propensity,  quite  void  of  anything  like  pure  love  or  affection,  produced  nothing  but 
an  act  that  was  merely  animal.  Their  need  once  gratified,  the  sexes  took  no  further 
notice  of  each  other,  and  even  the  child  was  nothing  to  his  mother,  the  moment  he 
could  do  without  her.  25
 
While  there  are  these  interactions,  what  remains  interesting  is  that  the  individual  does  not  notice 
another  until  one  feels  the  appetite  to  continue  the  species  and  even  with  this  recognition,  it  is  done 
with  “blind  propensity.”  The  very  moment  the  appetite  is  satisfied,“the  sexes  [take]  no  further 
notice  of  one  another”  and  continue  as  if  the  interaction  never  happened.  Likewise,  as  soon  as  the 
child  is  able  to  sustain  itself,  it  means  “nothing  to  [it’s]  mother.”  While  there  are  these  interactions, 
there  appears  to  be  a  gap  between  recognizing  another  human  in  terms  of  understanding  them  as  a 
being  and  seeing  them  as  merely  a  tool  for  self-survival,  just  how  the  man  saw  the  oak  tree.  
While  humans  remained  dominated  by  their  passions,  reproduction  forces  humans  to  adapt 
and  invent  in  order  to  survive  because  resources  which  were  at  first  easy  to  find  eventually  became 
24Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  90. 
25Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  114. 
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scarce.  This  ability  to  invent  is  what  Rousseau  calls perfectibilité, which  is  the  capacity  to  progress 
and  serves  as  human's  simultaneous  source  of  enlightenment  and  vice:  
There  was  a  necessity  for  becoming  active,  swiftfooted,  and  sturdy  in  battle.  The 
natural  arms,  which  are  stones  and  the  branches  of  trees,  soon  offered  themselves  to 
his  reach.  He  learned  to  surmount  the  obstacles  of  nature,  to  fight  when  necessary 
with  other  animals,  to  fight  for  his  subsistence  even  with  other  men,  or  indemnify 
himself  for  the  loss  of  whatever  he  found  himself  obliged  to  yield  to  a  stronger.   26
 
While  it  becomes  necessary  for  humans  to  evolve  physically  in  order  to  survive,  their  perception  of 
the  world  around  them  also  evolves.  “Natural  arms”  or  axes  “soon  offered  themselves  to  [their] 
reach.”  Even  though  branches  and  stones  existed  prior,  the  point  is  that  they  were  not  seen  as 
useful  until  survival  depended  on  their  combination.  Likewise,  an  individual  now  needs  to  be 
prepared  to  fight  in  order  to  survive,  and  thus  needs  to  be  aware  of  their  surroundings  in  ways  they 
had  not  before.  Self-preservation  now  requires  one  to  learn  how  to  make  relational  judgments 
about  who  is  stronger,  but  in  order  for  this  judgment  to  be  made,  one  needs  to  learn  about  their 
own  capabilities.  Through  the  inevitable  experience  of  battle  and  competition,  the  individual  is 
tested  and  learns  about  themself  through  the  recognized  differences  in  strength  or  strategy  they 
have  with  others.  
As  nature  continues  to  change,  and  competition  continues  to  increase,  perception  and 
recognition  continue  to  evolve.  However,  what  is  interesting  is  that  instead  of  perceiving  difference 
in  times  of  threat,  humans  begin  to  perceive  the  quality  of  likeness:  
[…]and  seeing  that  they  all  behaved  as  he  himself  would  have  done  in  similar 
circumstances,  he  concluded  that  their  manner  of  thinking  and  feeling  was  quite 
conformable  to  his  own;  and  this  important  truth,  when  once  engraved  deeply  on 
his  mind,  made  him  follow,  by  an  intuition  as  sure  and  swift  as  any  reasoning,  the 
best  rules  of  conduct,  which  for  the  sake  of  his  own  safety  and  advantage  it  was 
proper  he  should  observe  toward  them.  27
26Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  114. 
27Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  115. 
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Through  seeing  another  behave  in  the  same  manner  they  would  have,  one  is  made to  follow  “by  an 
intuition  as  sure  and  swift  as  any  reasoning”  the  “best  rules  of  conduct.”  This  recognition  of 
another  as  someone  like  them  provides  the  individual  with  an  intuitive  understanding  of  the  person, 
regardless  of  experience.  This  is  a  significant  moment  within  Rousseau's  narrative  as  it  pertains  to 
transparency  because  one  can  intrinsically  know  what  to  do  based  on  their  ability  to  recognize 
another  as  thinking  and  feeling  in  a  similar  manner  as  they  would.  It  is  this  repeated  recognition  of 
likeness  which  allows  one  to  realize  that  their  “common  interest  might  authorize  him  to  count  on 
the  assistance  of  his  fellows”  which  Rousseau  labels  “free  associations.”  These  “free  28
associations”  obligated  no  one  and  lasted  only  as  long  as  the  “transitory  necessity  that  had  given 
birth  to  it.”  This  recognition  of  likeness  not  only  provides  for  a  priori  understanding  of  the  other,  29
but  also  opens  up  the  possibility  for  an  unprecedented  conscious  joining  of  forces.  These  “free 
associations”  were  achievable  because  humans  felt  they  “[understood]  each  other  perfectly.”  It  30
was  only  through  seeing  another  behave  as  they  would  have,  and  thus  having  the  motivations  of 
each  other  clear  in  mind,  which  allowed  individuals  for  the  first  time  to  think  plurally  in  terms  of 
survival,  and  thus  join  together  for  a  common  goal  which  otherwise  might  not  have  been 
achievable.  
As  Rousseau’s  progression  through  the  state  of  nature  continues,  humans  proceeded  to 
become  “more  industrious  in  proportion  as  [their]  mind[s]  became  more  enlightened”  meaning 
instead  of  sleeping  under  the  oak  tree,  one  now  finds  shelter  in  cabins.  This  transformation,  which 
28Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  115.  
29Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  116. 
30Jonathan  Marks,  "Jean-Jacques  Rousseau,  Michael  Sandel  and  the  Politics  of  Transparency" 
( Polity  33,  no.  4  (2001)),  624. 
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Rousseau  deems  the  “epoch  of  the  first  revolution,”  paired  with  the  learned  success  of  “free 
associations,”  is  what  led  to  the  family  unit  and  an  “introduction  of  a  species  of  property.”  31
Humans  learned  that  there  is  a  benefit  in  numbers,  particularly  because  it  affords  an  increase  in 
ability  to  defend  and  protect  property:  
[...]no  one  could  have  any  great  temptation  to  seize  upon  that  of  his  neighbor,  not  so 
much  because  it  did  not  belong  to  him,  as  because  he  did  not  need  it;  and  as  he 
could  not  make  himself  master  of  it  without  exposing  himself  to  a  very  sharp  fight 
with  the  family  that  was  occupying  it.   32
 
With  the  establishment  of  a  familial  unit,  “no  one  could  not  have  any  great  temptation  to  seize  upon 
that  of  his  neighbor”  because  of  the  realization  that  one  would  be  outnumbered,  and  thus  be  at  a 
disadvantage.  Rousseau  concludes  that  these  individuals  found  it  “shorter  and  safer  to  imitate,  than 
to  attempt  to  dislodge”  and  so  we  find  the  creation  of  small  societies  through  this  new  sedentary 
life.  
In  this  new  social  state,  “everyone  began  to  notice  the  rest,  and  wished  to  be  noticed 
himself;  and  public  esteem  acquired  a  value.”  Some  traits  became  more  respected  than  others  such 
as  who  was  “the  handsomest,  the  strongest,  the  most  dexterous,  or  the  more  eloquent.”  For  33
Rousseau,  these  preferences  become  the  first  step  toward  inequality  and  vice.  While  one  felt  a  34
sense  of  vanity  and  contempt  for  possessing  the  preferred  traits,  another  felt  envy  and  shame  for 
not.  Over  time,  it  became  the  individuals’  prerogative  “to  appear  what  they  really  were  not”  so  that 
they  could  gain  an  advantage  in  society,  and  on  an  even  more  basic  level,  simply  fit  in  with 
custom.  Through  this  process,  individuals  become  chained  to  culture,  and  thus  lose  the  ability  to  35
31Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  116. 
32Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  116-117. 
33Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  118. 
34This  is  not  to  say  that  natural  inequality  had  not  existed  prior,  it  just  never  had  permanent  effects 
due  to  the  self-sufficient  and  nomadic  nature  of  humans. 
35Rousseau,  Social  Contract ,  ed.  Dunn,  122. 
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freely  be  themselves  because  their  value  became  set  off  of  how  well  they  could  fit  a  mold.  As 
society  grew  more  enlightened,  the  weight  of  these  chains  grew  heavier,  and  eventually  we  arrive 
at  the  society  Rousseau  wrote  of  in The  First  Discourse -  a  society  plagued  by  uncertainty  due  to 
the  loss  of  transparency.  With  this  understanding,  we  will  see  how  Rousseau’s  “general  will” 
attempts  to  re-establish  transparency  and  also  equality  through  the  idea  of  a  shared  common  will.  
In The  Social  Contract, Rousseau  makes  clear  two  different  wills:  the  “will  of  all”  and  the 
“general  will.”  The  will  of  all  is  concerned  with  private  interest,  while  the  general  will  is  concerned 
with  the  common  interest.  We  arrive  at  the  general  will  by  taking  away  “the  pluses  and  minuses 
[from  the  will  of  all]  which  cancel  each  other  out”  leaving  whatever  “remains  [as]  the  general 
will.”  Right  away,  the  general  will  is  attempting  to  resurrect  transparency  while  simultaneously  36
combating  inequality  because  “if  the  general  will  is  to  be  clearly  expressed,  it  is  imperative  that 
there  should  be  no  sectional  associations  in  the  state,  and  that  every  citizen  should  make  up  his 
own  mind  for  himself.”  The  expression  of  “every  citizen”  is  of  the  utmost  importance,  because  37
without  it,  the  general  will  can  not  be  determined.  Furthermore,  the  general  will  overrides  the  value 
in  “appear[ing]  what  they  really  [are]  not”  and  instead  calls  for  humans  to  be  exactly  who  they  are, 
so  that  ultimately,  they  can  be  united  by  a  common  will.  Rousseau  is  calling  for  transparency  and 
equality  as  the  means  of  uniting  people  in  a  world  where  it  has  become  disadvantageous  for  the 
individual  to  be  transparent  because  that  could  mean  risking  the  very  social  status  which 
determines  their  own  value.  However,  this  deep  change  in  the  fundamentals  of  man  begs  the 
question  of  how  the  general  will  could  be  implemented,  particularly  when  some  individuals  profit 
off  of  the  perpetuation  of  inequality.  It  is  here  that  we  are  introduced  to  the  sovereign.  
36Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  72-73.  
37Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  73.   
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One  might  think  that  the  role  of  a  sovereign  fundamentally  undermines  the  premise  of 
equality;  however,  Rousseau  makes  clear  that  equality  is  not  lost: 
It  is  not  a  covenant  between  a  superior  and  an  inferior,  but  a  covenant  of  the  body 
with  each  of  its  members.  It  is  a  legitimate  covenant,  because  its  basis  is  the  social 
contract;  an  equitable  one,  because  it  is  common  to  all;  a  useful  one,  because  it  can 
have  no  end  but  the  common  good;  and  it  is  a  durable  covenant  because  it  is 
guaranteed  by  the  armed  forces  and  the  supreme  power.  So  long  as  the  subjects 
submit  to  such  covenants  alone,  they  obey  nobody  but  their  own  will;  and  to  ask 
how  far  the  respective  rights  of  the  sovereign  and  the  citizen  extend  is  to  ask  how 
far  these  two  can  pledge  themselves  together,  each  to  all  and  all  to  each.   38
 
The  relationship  between  citizen  and  sovereign  is  not  one  of  inferior  and  superior,  but  is  an 
agreement  to  “the  body  with  each  of  its  members”  only.  This  agreement  is  “legitimate”  because  its 
basis  is  found  within  the  people.  It  is  fair  because  it  is  the  same  for  everyone,  including  the 
sovereign,  and  it  is  useful  because  it  can  have  “no  end  but  the  common  good.”  The  sovereign  and 
the  citizen  must  “pledge  themselves  together,  each  to  all  and  all  to  each”  which  again  reflects  a 
sense  of  equality  and  unity,  even  when  there  is  an  active  authority  figure  concretely  enforcing  the 
rights  of  the  citizen.  As  much  as  the  sovereign  is  enforcing  such  rights,  the  sovereign’s  rights  are 
likewise  contingent  on  the  citizen’s  willingness  to  obey.  Although  it  might  not  be  entirely  obvious, 
transparency  is  relevant  within  this  dynamic  as  well.  The  relationship  can  fundamentally  only  exist 
as  long  as  the  citizen  and  the  sovereign  are  transparent  with  one  another,  hence  the  need  to  pledge 
“each  to  all  and  all  to  each.”  Both  of  their  positionalities  are  dependent  on  one  another  being 
transparent  in  terms  of  intention  and  action,  which  means  operating  under  the  terms  that  make  the 
covenant  equitable  and  legitimate.  We  can  again  see  this  need  for  transparency  and  furthermore 
how  it  becomes  necessary  for  establishing  and  maintaining  equality,  particularly  in  an  objectively 
hierarchical  relationship.  
38Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  77. 
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However,  Rousseau  in  the  above  passage  also  writes  that  the  covenant  is  durable  because  it 
is  “guaranteed  by  the  armed  forces  and  the  supreme  being.”  Both  the  idea  of  an  armed  force  and  a 
supreme  being  stuck  out  to  me  as  running  counter  to  the  overwhelming  sense  of  equality  and  need 
for  transparency  otherwise  found  within  the  passage.  The  need  to  have  someone  physically  enforce 
the  general  will  raises  questions  of  if  the  citizens  are  viewing  the  will  as  their  own.  If  they  were, 
why  would  there  need  to  be  armed  forces  to  ensure  its  durability  in  the  first  place?  Likewise,  the 
“supreme  being”  within  this  context  refers  to  God,  but  claiming  that  the  covenant  is  durable 
because  of  God  forces  us  to  consider  how  this  could  be.  Particularly  when  Rousseau  claims  “all 
justice  comes  from  God,  who  alone  is  its  source”  and  that  “if  only  we  knew  how  to  receive 
[justice]  from  that  exalted  fountain,  we  should  need  neither  governments  nor  laws.”  Laws  remain  39
to  be  the  “conditions  on  which  civil  society  exists”  and  we  are  unable  to  receive  knowledge  from 
God,  but  yet  the  covenant  is  also  made  durable  because  of  God.  If  we  need  laws  and  can  not  40
receive  laws  from  God,  we  are  left  to  consider  where  just  laws  can  come  from: 
To  discover  the  rules  of  society  that  are  best  suited  to  nations,  there  would  need  to 
exist  a  superior  intelligence,  who  could  understand  the  passions  of  men  without 
feeling  any  of  them,  who  had  no  affinity  with  our  nature  but  knew  it  to  the  full, 
whose  happiness  was  independent  of  ours,  but  who  would  nevertheless  make  out 
happiness  his  concern,  who  would  be  content  to  wait  in  the  fullness  of  time  for  a 
distant  glory,  and  to  labour  in  one  age  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  another.  Gods  would  be 
needed  to  give  men  laws.  41
 
The  fact  that  “Gods  would  be  needed  to  give  men  laws”  suggests  the  impossibility  of  the  task  of 
discovering  what  laws  are  “best  suited  to  nations.”  However,  even  if  the  task  is  impossible  or 
requires  a  God,  we  still  are  introduced  to  the  lawgiver.  The  lawgiver  “is  the  engineer  who  invents 
39Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  80.  
40Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  83. 
41Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  84. 
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the  machine;  the  prince  is  merely  the  mechanic  who  sets  it  up  and  operates  it.”  What  does  he  42
mean  when  he  uses  the  word  “machine”  and  that  it  is  something  to  be  “set  up  and  operated?” 
Knowing  what  we  do  about  the  relationship  of  the  sovereign  and  the  citizen,  presumably  this  is  a 
reference  to  laws,  which  if  we  recall,  were  supposed  to  come  from  the  general  will.  If  the  lawgiver 
is  establishing  laws,  and  Gods  would  be  needed  to  give  men  laws,  it  is  reasonable  to  conclude  that 
the  lawgiver  is  a  God-like  figure.  I  argue  the  presence  of  the  lawgiver  complicates  what  otherwise 
is  a  clear  call  for  transparency  and  equality  in  civil  society.  
The  relationship  between  the  lawgiver  and  the  sovereign  and  citizens  is  fundamentally 
different  from  that  of  the  citizens  and  that  of  the  sovereign  and  citizen.  The  lawgiver  is  the 
“engineer  who  invents  the  machine”  while  the  sovereign  is  “merely  the  mechanic  who  sets  it  up 
and  operates  it.”  The  word  choice  of  “inventor”  juxtaposed  with  “ merely  the  mechanic”  provides 
an  undeniable  sense  of  superiority  in  favor  of  the  lawgiver,  which  outwardly  appears  to  run  counter 
to  the  attempts  of  establishing  equality.  Likewise,  the  general  will,  which  was  supposed  to  be 
established  by  the  people  and  served  to  unite  them  because  it  was  their  own  laws  and  thus  an 
extension  of  them,  is  actually  created  by  the  lawgiver  who  discovers  the  laws  to  which  society 
operates.  Here  we  see  notions  of  equality  come  into  tension  with  the  necessity  of  inequality.  The 
citizens  are  uniting  to  establish  their  general  will  but  the  lawgiver,  because  of  their  superior 
qualities,  can  override  the  citizens.  This  leads  us  to  question  what  exactly  the  general  will  is: 
[…]the  general  will  is  always  rightful  and  always  tends  to  the  public  good;  but  it 
does  not  follow  that  the  deliberations  of  the  people  are  always  equally  right.  We 
always  want  what  is  advantageous  to  us  but  we  do  not  always  discern  it.  The 
people  is  never  corrupted,  but  it  is  often  misled;  and  only  then  does  it  seem  to  will 
what  is  bad.   43
 
42Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  84. 
43Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  72.  
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The  general  will  is  still  geared  toward  the  public  good,  however  the  people  are  “often  misled”  and 
thus  will  what  is  “bad”  because  they  are  “not  always  able  to  discern''  what  is  advantageous  to 
them.  This  inability  for  people  to  know  what  is  good  for  them,  paired  with  their  frequent  ability  to 
be  deceived,  is  why  there  is  a  need  for  the  lawgiver.  Through  this  claim,  the  necessity  of  inequality 
becomes  apparent  because  without  the  lawgiver,  the  people  could  never  know  what  the  “common 
good”  is.  However,  if  the  people  discovered  that  their  efforts  and  involvement  in  establishing  the 
general  will  were  useless,  it  is  not  hard  to  imagine  how  this  would  easily  destroy  the  uniting  and 
equalizing  effects  transparency  established  through  the  general  will  for  the  citizens.  It  is  the 
recognition  of  this  potential  reversal,  which  helps  to  explain  why  the  lawgiver's  position,  in  terms 
of  office  and  power,  is  deliberately  made  obscure. 
 The  lawgiver  is  “extraordinary  not  only  because  of  his  genius,  but  equally  because  of  his 
office,  which  is  neither  that  of  the  government  nor  that  of  the  sovereign.”  The  lawgiver  also  has 
seemingly  unchecked,  undetectable  power.  The  lawgiver  “must  have  recourse  to  an  authority  of 
another  order,  one  which  can  compel  without  violence  and  persuade  without  convincing.”  What  44
is  this  “authority  of  another  order?”  It  is  divine  intervention: 
It  is  this  which  has  obliged  the  founders  of  nations  throughout  history  to  appeal  to 
divine  intervention  and  to  attribute  their  own  wisdom  to  the  Gods;  for  then  the 
people,  feeling  subject  to  the  laws  of  the  state  as  they  are  to  those  of  nature,  and 
detecting  the  same  hand  in  the  creation  of  both  man  and  the  nation,  obey  freely  and 
bear  with  docility  the  yoke  of  public  welfare.  45
 
If  we  return  to  Rousseau’s  description  of  the  “supreme  being”  as  making  the  covenant  durable,  this 
ability  for  one  person  to  claim  divine  intervention  proves  to  be  extremely  significant.  Essentially, 
this  trick  forces  (for  without  this  trick,  one  otherwise  might  not  obey)  the  citizen  to  “obey  freely 
44Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  87.  
45Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  87.  
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and  bear  with  docility  the  yoke  of  public  welfare.”  While  most  would  consider  this  to  be  a  lie, 
Rousseau  astonishingly  calls  it  “sublime  reasoning,”  but  it  nonetheless  serves  to  condition  man 
toward  what  the  lawgiver  perceives  to  be  the  common  good:  
This  sublime  reasoning,  which  soars  above  the  heads  of  the  common  people,  is 
used  by  the  lawgiver  when  he  puts  his  own  decisions  into  the  mouth  of  the 
immortals,  thus  compelling  by  divine  authority  persons  who  cannot  be  moved  by 
human  prudence.  46
 
If  the  people  cannot  recognize  through  their  own  reason  that  the  lawgiver  (to  their  knowledge,  the 
sovereign)  is  correct,  they  will  be  compelled  “by  divine  authority”  to  follow  what  the  lawgiver 
prescribes.  The  lawgiver  can  lie  without  being  discovered,  so  much  so,  it  “soars  above  the  heads  of 
the  common  people.”  He  is  both  everywhere  and  nowhere;  he  exists  outside  of  the  government, 
sovereign  and  has  absolute  power,  all  the  while  remaining  undetected  by  the  people.  
As  it  was  shown  to  us  before  through  Rousseau’s  account  of  man,  inequality  precludes 
transparency.  This  still  is  true,  however,  something  is  different  in  the  case  of  the  lawgiver  because 
Rousseau  endorses  their  superiority  and  praises  their  obscurity  from  the  citizens.  The  loss  of 
transparency  on  behalf  of  the  lawgiver  to  the  citizen  is  built  into  his  politics,  and  subsequently  is 
not  treated  as  a  loss  but  rather  a  necessary  movement.  Inequality  is  deemed  productive  and 
necessary  because  without  it,  the  general  will  could  never  remain  geared  toward  the  common 
good.  The  citizens  remain  oblivious  to  the  fact  that  they  have  no  say  in  their  laws,  and  that  they  are 
actually  being  conditioned  to  obey  the  “yoke  of  public  welfare.”  The  role  of  the  lawgiver  shows 
that  inequality  is  necessary  and  politically  productive  because  of  the  transformative  effects  it  can 
have  on  man;  however,  man  must  remain  unaware  of  this  process.  In  this  way,  we  conclude  from 
Rousseau  that  the  perception  of  transparency  in  politics  is,  in  many  ways,  necessary,  but  actual 
46Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  87.  
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transparency  is  not;  in  fact,  actual  transparency  would  undermine  the  work  being  done  to  condition 
man  toward  public  welfare.  Likewise,  political  inequality  is  necessary  but  must  remain  hidden 
because  if  realized,  it  would  reveal  that  the  general  will  does  not  actually  come  from  the  citizens 
directly,  but  that  it  is  imposed  on  them.  
If  we  now  return  back  to  the  opening  line  of The Social  Contract, this  understanding 
allows  us  to  engage  the  potential  of  the  aforementioned  “if”  more  directly: 
My  purpose  is  to  consider if ,  in  political  society,  there  can  be  any  legitimate  and 
sure  principle  of  government,  taking  men  as  they  are  and  laws  as  they  might  be. 
 
It  appears  to  me  that  we  could  go  one  of  two  ways  -  the  first  being  that  we  take  the  illusion  of 
transparency  and  inequality  as  necessary  in  order  to  establish  equality,  and  the  second  being  the 
fictional  capacity  of  the  lawgiver,  and  thus  the  impossibility  of  equality.  Beginning  with  the  former, 
if  we  have  a  society  that  profits  off  of  inequality  and  has  no  way  to  unite  together  because  of  the 
mistrust  and  deception  which  has  become  customary,  it  is  arguable  that  society  would  need  to  be 
conditioned  toward  equality.  However,  this  conditioning  would  need  to  be  conducted  by  someone 
who  knows  how  to  obtain  equality  within  society,  while  also  establishing  equality  in  secret  for  the 
people  would  likely  not  endorse  such  a  transformation.  So,  we  find  the  illusion  of  transparency 
amongst  the  people  in  that  they  are  uniting  under  the  idea  of  the  general  will,  which  they  have  no 
control  over,  and  we  find  inequality  in  the  relationship  between  the  lawgiver  and  the  citizen.  Both 
of  which  remain  necessary  in  the  establishment  of  equality.  However,  to  frame  the  possibility  of 
establishing  equality  as  conditional  on  having  a  lawgiver  who  is  to  be  a  God  in  human  form, 
strikes  to  be  mere  fiction.  As  such,  if  the  lawgiver  itself  is  impossible,  it  follows  that  equality  is  also 
unobtainable  -  and  so  we  reach  the  latter  of  the  possible  directions. 
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Returning  back  to  the  former,  the  only  reason  the  manipulation  of  the  people  is  acceptable 
is  because  it  serves  the  purpose  of  the  common  good.  However,  this  assumes  that  the  lawgiver  is 
able  to  know  (with  absolute  certainty)  truths  that  the  people  are  incapable  of  knowing,  such  as 
what  the  common  good  is.  Due  to  this,  the  lawgiver  is  afforded  the  freedom  to  condition  the  people 
with  absolute  power.  This  linkage  between  certainty  and  power  makes  sense;  however,  one  must 
push  back  and  ask  how  this  certainty  can  be  tested,  or  if  it  even  can  be  tested.  When  we  consider 
the  claim  “worthless  tricks  may  set  up  transitory  bonds,  but  only  wisdom  makes  lasting  ones”  it 
appears  time  can  be  the  only  judge  of  the  lawgiver's  supposed  certainty.  What  does  this  mean  for  47
the  citizens  living  under  the  hidden  direction  of  the  lawgiver?  Blind  obedience  and  thus,  no  agency 
due  to  the  illusion  of  transparency  of  the  general  will  from  the  lawgiver  -  imagine  all  that  could  be 
lost  if  the  lawgiver  is  wrong  but  likewise,  all  that  could  be  gained  if  the  lawgiver  is  correct.  Is  it  the 
granting  of  absolute  power  worth  the  risk?  
We  might  also  ask  to  what  end?  Both  in  terms  of  the  individual  and  societal  longevity. 
Although  equality  might  be  obtainable,  it  appears  that  the  individual  through  this  conditioning 
jeopardizes  their  very  personhood.  Likewise,  the  very  restructuring  of  society  could  result  in  the 
complete  collapse  of  it.  Rousseau  notes  that  “a  people  does  not  become  famous  until  its 
constitution  begins  to  decline.  We  do  not  know  for  how  many  centuries  the  constitution  of 
Lycurgus  gave  happiness  to  the  Spartans  before  there  was  talk  about  them  in  the  rest  of  Greece.”  48
If  a  constitution  fails,  does  this  not  mean  those  who  wrote  it  were  wrong?  Rousseau  glorifies 
Sparta,  but  Sparta  no  longer  exists.  Thus,  time  will  tell  that  Lycurgus  was  objectively  wrong  by 
Rousseau's  standard  because  he  did  not  establish  a  lasting  bond.  Furthermore,  it  seems  that  the 
47Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  87.  
48Rousseau,  Social  Contract,  trans.  Cranston,  84.  
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collapse  of  Sparta  is  not  even  a  problem  for  Rousseau  considering  he  instead  emphasizes  how  we 
could  not  possibly  know  for  how  many centuries “Lycurgus  gave  happiness  to  the  Spartans,” 
while  assuming  the  effects  of  the  constitution  were  that  of  happiness  to  begin  with.  Sparta  was  a 
warrior  society,  had  many  slaves,  and  was  centered  around  ideas  of  duty  and  obedience  toward  the 
state  -  interesting  qualities  Rousseau  equates  with  “happiness.”  
With  Sparta  serving  as  the  example  for  Rousseau,  paired  with  what  he  presents  in The 
Social  Contract, it  seems  to  me  that  the  reconditioning  of  man  under  particular  terms  may  render  an 
equal  man  and  a  place  where  transparency  can  once  again  be  realized,  but  it  is  only  made  possible 
through  the  secret  stripping  down  of  man  and  the  manipulation  of  what  remains.  Can  this 
transparency  even  be  called  transparency  if  it  is  realized  through  imposition?  Can  equality  be 
established  within  a  framework  where  it  is  not  realized  and  enforced  by  the  power  of  an 
institution?  Regardless,  the  basic  notion  that  this  political  certainty  has  existed  before  through 
Sparta  and  could  exist  again,  is  dangerous,  particularly  when  the  ability  to  determine  if  it  is  faulty  is 
dependent  on  time.  Which,  as  we  consider  Maximilien  Robespierre,  it  will  show  just  how 
dangerous  the  notion  of  political  certainty  can  be. 
Robespierre  campaigned  on  a  vision  of  democracy  from The  Social  Contract arguing  that 
the  rule  of  the  people  was  to  “ensure  the  triumph  of  the  good,  pure,  general  will  of  the  people  - 
what  the  people  would  want  in  ideal  circumstances  -  and  this  needed  to  be  intuited  on  their  behalf 
until  they  had  received  sufficient  education  to  understand  their  own  good.”  He  issued  a  journal  49
which  served  as  a  platform  for  him  to  express  “both  his  theoretical  and  his  practical  political 
concerns.”  He  pushed  to  be  a  representative  of  the  Third  Estate,  which  he  was  elected  to  in  1789 
49Ruth  Scurr,  Fatal  Purity:  Robespierre  and  the  French  Revolution  (London:  Vintage,  2007),  211 .  
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and  before  he  left  to  go  to  Versailles,  he  published  a  pamphlet  entitled  ‘The  Enemies  of  the 
Fatherland  Unmasked,’  which  is  reflective  of  his  political  paranoia  and  the  need  to  establish 
transparency.  50
 In  August  of  1792,  he  was  elected  to  the  municipal  Commune  governing  Paris  just  two  
days  after  the  fall  of  the  monarchy.  His  speeches  during  this  time  “had  a  peculiar  combination  of 
acute  political  suspicion  and  personal  animosity  towards  anyone  who  disagreed  with  him.”  He  51
was  often  quoting  some  version  of  Rousseau,  and  quoted  directly  the  phrase: le  peuple  veut  le  bien, 
mais  il  ne  le  voit  pas  toujours meaning  the  people  want  what  is  good,  but  they  do  not  always  see  it. 
 On  November  5th  of  1792,  Robespierre  was  elected  to  the  new  National  Convention,  which  52
held  significant  power  being  that  it’s  members  were  elected  to  provide  the  new  constitution  of 
France.  Later  that  month,  the  Convention  decided  on  making  France  a  republic  to  which 
Robespierre  was  determined  to  separate  the  members  of  the  Convention  who  wanted  the  republic 
for  selfish  reasons  and  those,  like  Robespierre,  who  wanted  to  found  the  republic  on  the  principle 
of  equality  and  the  general  interest.  Prior  to  this  decision,  Robespierre  had  been  “too  busy”  to  53
publish  his  journal,  but  after  the  republic  was  decided  on,  he  saw  it  as  an  opportunity  to  revisit  his 
long  standing  fear  of  executive  power.  
In  one  article,  Robespierre  quotes  a  passage  from  Rousseau  where  he  is  describing  the 
qualities  of  the  lawgiver: 
To  discover  the  rules  of  society  that  are  best  suited  to  nations,  there  would  need  to 
exist  a  superior  intelligence,  who  could  understand  the  passions  of  men  without 
feeling  any  of  them  who  had  no  affinity  with  our  nature  but  knew  it  to  the  full, 
whose  happiness  was  independent  of  ours,  but  who  would  nevertheless  make  out 
50Scurr,  Fatal  Purity,  209. 
51Scurr,  Fatal  Purity,  173.  
52Scurr,  Fatal  Purity,  173. 
53Scurr,  Fatal  Purity,  210. 
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happiness  his  concern,  who  would  be  content  to  wait  in  the  fullness  of  time  for  a 
distant  glory,  and  to  labour  in  one  age  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  another.  Gods  would  be 
needed  to  give  men  laws. 
 
However,  instead  of  leaving  the  passage  as  is,  Robespierre  adjusts  it  and  formulates  his  own 
version  to  be  published  as  well: 
You  will  need  philosophers  as  enlightened  as  they  were  intrepid:  who  experienced 
the  passions  of  man,  but  whose  first  passions  would  be  the  horror  of  tyranny  and 
the  love  of  humanity;  treading  underfoot  vanity,  envy,  ambition  and  all  the 
weaknesses  of  petty  souls,  inexorable  toward  crime  armed  with  power,  indulgent 
toward  error,  sympathetic  toward  misery  and  tender  and  respectful  toward  the 
people.  54
 
This  new  version  not  only  eliminated  the  association  of  the  lawgiver  as  God  and  framed  it  so  “an 
unusually  admirable  human  being-Robespierre  himself,  for  example”  could  act  as  the  lawgiver,  but 
it  also  took  the  idea  of  the  lawgiver  as  an  impossibility  and  shifted  it  to  the  realm  of  possibility.  55
Less  than  a  year  later  on  July  27,  1793,  Robespierre  was  voted  onto  the  Committee  of  Public 
Safety  where  under  his  leadership,  the  committee  came  to  exercise  dictatorial  control  over  the 
French  government,  all  the  while  claiming  the  Russeauistic  ideals  of  “a  prim  society  of  patriotic, 
uncorrupted,  serious  equals.”  And  so  we  find  that  the  lawgiver,  with  all  of  its  absolute  power,  56
becomes  a  reality.  
Less  than  two  months  later,  The  Reign  of  Terror  begins  led  by  none  other  than 
Robespierre.  During  this  time,  Robespierre  jailed  and  killed  anyone  who  was perceived  to  be 
against  his  Revolution.  This  paranoia,  while  in  many  ways  reflects  the  original  need  for 
transparency,  it  also,  to  some  extent,  reflects  its  practical  impossibility  -  one  can  never  really  know 
the  motivations  of  another  because  we  are  humans,  not  Gods.  Nonetheless,  Robespierre’s  reality 
54Scurr,  Fatal  Purity,  210. 
55Scurr,  Fatal  Purity,  210. 
56Scurr,  Fatal  Purity,  275. 
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became  the  only  reality  that  mattered.  He  operated  with  absolute  certainty  as  the  lawgiver, 
believing  that  he  was  revolutionizing  France,  but  as  time  has  shown  us,  he  was  not  only  wrong, 
but  ruined  any  progress  the  Revolution  had  made  toward  equality.  As  such,  we  are  left  again  to 
consider  if  the  risk  of  having  a  lawgiver  is  worthwhile  and  by  doing  so,  question  the  possibility 
and/or  limitations  of  political  certainty.  This  questioning  of  political  certainty  brings  us  to  the 
second  potential  of  the  “if,”  that  being  the  fictional  capacity  of  the  lawgiver.  
“Gods  would  be  needed  to  give  men  laws”  but  yet,  Rousseau  introduces  the  lawgiver  not 
as  a  God,  but  as  a  man.  The  lawgiver  is  someone  who  has  incredible  genius,  and  thus  an  ability  to 
know  what  the  common  good  is  and  therefore  serves  to  correct  the  general  will  when  the  people 
are  misled.  The  lawgiver,  as  argued  earlier,  has  absolute  authority.  He  is  the  “engineer”  of  the 
political  system,  while  his  office  remains  outside  of  the  government  and  sovereign.  He  is  the  man 
behind  the  curtain,  an  omnipotent  being.  In  every  respect,  the  lawgiver  parallels  that  of  a  God,  but 
Rousseau  still  distinguishes  them  as  human.  An  example  of  this  is  when  Rousseau  writes  of  divine 
intervention  being  “used  by  the  lawgiver  when  he  puts  his  own  decisions  into  the  mouth  of  the 
immortals.”  Differentiation  is  done  to  separate  the  lawgiver  from  that  of  the  immortals;  however, 
the  lawgiver  has  the  power  to  “put  his  own  decisions  into  the  mouth  of  the  immortals”  and 
effectively  convince  the  citizens  to  follow  his  decisions.  In  this  way,  we  can  see  how  Rousseau 
writes  that  the  lawgiver  is  not  a  God,  but  when  it  comes  to  his  power,  is  very  much  a  God.  While 
Rousseau  continues  to  claim  the  lawgiver  is  a  man,  within  the  particular  system  as  presented  in The 
Social  Contract ,  the  line  between  God  and  man  is  blurred.  It  is  this  blurring  and  confusion  that 
surrounds  the  lawgiver  which  makes  it  apparent  that  an  entity  sporting  the  qualities  of  a  lawgiver 
would  not  only  be  rare,  but  altogether  unthinkable.  As  such,  this  impossibility  forces  us  to  consider 
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if  Rousseau  was  aware  of  the  impossibility  of  the  lawgiver,  and  if  not,  why?  And  if  so,  what  is  the 
purpose  of  the  lawgiver?  
Jean  Starobinski,  who  has  written  and  analyzed  Rousseau  extensively  as  a  literary  critic, 
approaches  Rousseau  and  the  entirety  of  his  work  from  a  psychoanalytic  lens.  Starobinski  argues 
that  Rousseau’s  need  for  transparency  began  within  himself  and  thus  expanded  outward  rendering 
Rousseau  paranoid  about  “an  overbearing  world  of  infinite  obstacles.”  Starobinski  argues  further 
that  Rousseau's  politics  are  a  commitment  to  liberate  man  from  the  “ornamentation  and  masking 
that  defined  aristocratic  society.”  Although  this  is  a  simplified  account  of  Starobinski’s  argument,  57
it  does  reflect  why  Rousseau  clung  to  transparency  and  a  desire  to  return  to  his  state  of  nature.  In 
this  way,  we  could  conceive  of  the  argument  that  it  did  not  matter  if  the  lawgiver  was  largely 
fictional  in  practice,  but  that  for  Rousseau  himself,  it  was  important  he  was  able  to  establish  the 
possibility,  no  matter  how  slight,  of  a  return  to  the  state  of  nature  and  the  resurrection  of 
transparency.  While  this  shift  of  focus  to  Rousseau’s  “neurosis”  allows  us  to  make  sense  of  his 
work  (especially  the  inconsistencies),  there  is  still  much  to  be  gained  if  we  pay  attention  to  the  text 
itself,  particularly  through  the  struggle  he  displays  in  distinguishing  the  lawgiver  from  God.  
As  we  analyze  this  struggle,  what  remains  most  striking  is  Rousseau's  determination  to 
maintain  that  the  lawgiver  is  a  man,  not  a  God.  Even  when  Rousseau  writes  that  laws  would  need 
to  come  from  Gods,  he  still  declares  that  the  lawgiver  is  human.  No  matter  how  much  the  lawgiver 
operates  as  a  God,  Rousseau  continues  to  deem  them  as  a  man.  This  suggests  that  Rousseau  is 
grappling  with  a  particular  tension  -  the  potential  for  equality  and  the  actuality  of  equality.  The 
continued  delineation  of  the  two  (man  and  God)  reflects  his  yearning  for  the  possibility  of  equality 
57Stefanos  Geroulanos,  Transparency  in  Postwar  France:  A  Critical  History  of  the  Present 
(Stanford:  Stanford  Press,  2017),  1-2. 
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in  society  while  the  substantive  role  of  the  lawgiver  reflects  the  opposite.  The  actuality  of  such  a 
lawgiver  in  itself  is  impossible,  and  it  is  through  this  impossibility,  which  suggests  that  equality 
within  society  is  unrealizable.  In  this  way,  Rousseau's  project  becomes  far  more  dynamic.  It  was 
already  shown  that  there  is  a  tension  between  the  desire  for  equality  and  the  simultaneous  need  to 
have  a  lawgiver  with  absolute  power  and  who  is  deceitful  toward  the  citizens  in  order  to  establish 
equality.  While  the  struggle  Rousseau  displays  reflects  the  same  problem  of  potentiality  and 
actuality,  instead  of  it  being  intentional,  it  feels  rather  unintentional.  This  speaks  not  only  to  the 
weight  of  the  tension,  but  also  to  the  fact  that  the  question  of  the  potential  of  equality  within  society 
remains  a  question,  even  if  he  seems  to  have  an  answer.  
Rousseau’s  political  conclusions  are  confusing,  contradictory  and  counterintuitive  for  a 
number  of  reasons.  However,  his  continued  engagement  with  the  tension  between  the  potential  and 
the  actual  should  not  be  overlooked.  If  we  pay  attention  to  the  inconsistencies  which  emerge  from 
his  attempt  to  reconcile  equality  with  society,  we  are  left  to  question  the  risk  and  benefit  of  political 
certainty,  the  ability  or  inability  for  the  individual  to  transform  to  the  collective,  and  ultimately  and 
most  profoundly,  what  can  connect  us  together  as  humans,  particularly  in  civil  society.  While 
Rousseau’s  conclusions  lend  themselves  to  both  poles  of  the  political  spectrum,  so  do  the  questions 
which  emerge  from  his  work.  As  such,  we  once  again  find  ourselves  left  uncertain  on  how  these 
tensions  can  be  resolved,  if  at  all.  
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3 
Burke’s  Skepticism:  Revolution  vs.  Reform 
 
Before  I  delve  into  the  specifics  of  the  chapter,  I  would  be  remiss  to  not  point  out  the 
significance  it  has  for  me.  I  began  this  project  curious  about  the  role  of  skepticism,  particularly  the 
ways  in  which  it  grants  the  freedom  to  question  what  we  hold  to  be  true  and  thus  gives  each 
individual  the  ability  to  determine  what  is  certain,  as  we  saw  so  powerfully  with  Descartes.  But,  as 
this  is  true,  I  was  also  curious  to  see  how  skepticism  might  work  in  the  opposite  way.  As  much  as 
skepticism  can  provide  freedom  and  agency,  skepticism  is  always  a  narrative  in  progress  and  one 
that  can  be  retold.  Skepticism  can  also  generate  an  avoidant  turning  back  and  over-reliance  on 
what  is  immediate.  This  second  movement  of  skepticism  will  be  my  focus.  
In  this  chapter,  I  will  turn  to  Edmund  Burke,  who  is  considered  to  be  the  founder  of 
modern  conservatism,  despite  the  fact  that  in  the  19th  century,  he  had  a  split  political  reception  just 
like  Jean-Jacques  Rousseau  did.  Burke  was  deemed  “the  greatest  Englishman  since  Milton”  by 
Thomas  Macaulay,  and  this  same  verdict  was  later  endorsed  by  John  Morley.  Alternatively,  58
Burke  was  practically  pilloried  by  Karl  Marx  in  Das  Kapital  where  Marx  wrote: 
The  sycophant-who  in  the  pay  of  the  English  oligarchy  played  the  romantic 
laudator  temporis  acti  against  the  French  Revolution  just  as,  in  the  pay  of  the  North 
American  colonies  at  the  beginning  of  the  American  troubles,  he  had  played  the 
liberal  against  the  English  oligarchy-  was  an  out-and-out  vulgar  bourgeois.  59
 
Marx  refers  to  Burke  as  the  sycophant,  and  as  such,  minimizes  Burke’s  political  ideas  as  being 
nothing  more  than  a  servile  obedience  to  the  English  oligarchy.  He  accuses  Burke  of  superficially 
58Dennis  O’Keeffe,  Edmund  Burke:  Major  Conservative  and  Libertarian  Thinkers ,  (New  York: 
Bloomsbury  Publishing,  2013)  90. 
59Karl  Marx  et  al., Capital:  A  Critique  of  Political  Economy ,  (United  States:  Modern  Library,  1906), 
832. 
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playing  the  “romantic  l audator  temporis  acti ”  against  the  French  Revolution,  precisely  because  the 
French  Revolution  was  attempting  to  destroy  the  same  unequal  systems  which  the  English 
oligarchy  profited  from.  All  in  all,  Marx  views  Burke  as  nothing  more  than  a  puppet  for  the 
English  oligarchy  and  the  continuation  of  its  principles  against  any  equalizing  efforts  made  on 
behalf  of  the  proletariat.  
Mary  Wollstonecraft  also  has  an  equally  important  critique  of  Burke.  In  response  to  Burke's 
Reflections  on  the  Revolution  in  France ,  she  writes  in  her  Vindication  of  the  Rights  of  Men : 
Misery  to  reach  your  heart  I  perceive,  must  have  its  caps  and  bells;  your  tears  are 
reserved,  very  naturally  considering  your  character,  for  the  declamation  of  the 
theater,  or  for  the  downfall  of  queens,  whose  rank  throws  a  graceful  veil  over  vices 
that  degrade  humanity;  but  the  distress  of  many  industrious  mothers  whose 
helpmates  have  been  torn  from  them,  and  the  hungry  cry  of  the  helpless  babes, 
were  vulgar  sorrows  that  could  not  move  your  commiseration,  though  they  might 
extort  an  alms.  60
 
Due  to  Burke’s  elitism,  Wollstonecraft  accuses  him  of  not  only  caring  for  just  the  aristocrats,  but  of 
being  incapable  of  feeling  any  emotion  toward  the  rest  of  society.  She  notes  that  even  the  cry  of 
hunger  from  helpless  babes  still  could  not  provoke  his  compassion  and  pity  but  yet,  he  is  very 
readily  able  to  cry  at  “the  downfall  of  the  queen”  whose  very  existence  serves  to  place  a  “graceful 
veil”  over  the  unequal  and  oppressive  systems  which  govern  the  people.  
While  both  Marx  and  Wollstonecraft  offer  quite  damning  criticism  of  Burke, I  do  however 
wish  to  consider  the  purpose  of  Burke’s  position,  particularly  because  “no  other  philosophical 
writing  on  politics  succeeded  in  predicting  so  accurately  and  with  such  relevant  specificity  the 
course  of  subsequent  events.”  Burke  began  writing  Reflections  on  the  Revolution  in  France  in  61
60Mary  Wollstonecraft,  A  Vindication  of  the  Rights  of  Men,  (London:  J.  Johnson,  1790). 
61Michael  Mosher,  "The  Skeptic's  Burke:  Reflections  on  the  Revolution  in  France,  1790-1990," 
( Political  Theory  19,  no.  3,  1991),  400. 
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January  or  February  of  1790,  while  the  book  itself  was  published  in  November  of  that  same  year. 
This  is  to  say  that  Burke  was  writing  during  the  “peaceful  year  of  the  Revolution”  and  still  warned 
with  remarkable  accuracy  of  what  would  follow  in  France.  As  such,  Burke  deserves  to  be  62
explored  beyond  the  simplifications  which  Marx  and  Wollstonecraft  make  of  his  political  ideology. 
I  will  therefore  attempt  to  bring  forth  some  of  Burke’s  complexities.  
While  we  saw  in  “Rousseau's  Certainty:  Equality  in  Theory  and  Practice”  that  Rousseau 
began  from  the  premise  that  equality  is  necessary  and  good  in  principle  but  then  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  equality  might  not  be  politically  feasible  in  actuality,  I  will  argue  that  Burke’s 
skepticism  leads  him  to  begin  his  thinking  with  the  acceptance  of  inequality  as  a  present  and 
necessary  reality.  I  will  claim  that  because  of  this  acceptance  of  inequality,  Burke  is  able  to  engage 
with  the  tension  between  the  potentiality  and  actuality  of  equality  directly,  which  results  in  a 
political  ideology  that  opposes  revolution,  but  yet  prioritizes  reform.  
Burke  undoubtedly  relies  on  the  idea  of  inheritance,  but  while  he  has  been  criticized  for 
placing  a  superficial  value  on  tradition,  we  are  able  to  see  why  it  is  of  genuine  importance  to  him:  
You  will  observe  that  from  Magna  Charta  to  the  Declaration  of  Right  it  has  been  the 
uniform  policy  of  our  constitution  to  claim  and  assert  our  liberties  as  an  entailed 
inheritance  derived  to  us  from  our  forefathers,  and  to  be  transmitted  to  our 
posterity—as  an  estate  specially  belonging  to  the  people  of  this  kingdom,  without 
any  reference  whatever  to  any  other  more  general  or  prior  right.  By  this  means  our 
constitution  preserves  a  unity  in  so  great  a  diversity  of  its  parts.  We  have  an 
inheritable  crown,  an  inheritable  peerage,  and  a  House  of  Commons  and  a  people 
inheriting  privileges,  franchises,  and  liberties  from  a  long  line  of  ancestors.  This 
policy  appears  to  me  to  be  the  result  of  profound  reflection,  or  rather  the  happy 
effect  of  following  nature,  which  is  wisdom  without  reflection,  and  above  it.   63
 
62Michael  Mosher,  "The  Skeptic's  Burke,”  400. 
63Edmund  Burke,  Reflections  on  the  Revolution  in  France,  ed.  by  J.  G.  A.  Pocock,  (Indianapolis, 
IN:  Hackett  Publishing,  1987),  29. 
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Burke  views  inheritance  similarly  to  how  we  view  culture:  it  is  cultivated  over  time,  it  has  with  it 
the  capacity  to  unite,  it  carries  with  it  a  sense  of  respect  as  well  as  a  desire  to  reflect  on  how  it  came 
to  be,  and  establishes  a  deep  valuement  of  what  it  represents.  As  such,  Burke  brings  attention  to  the 
fact  that  across  England's  constitutional  history,  their  “uniform  policy”  has  been  the  claiming  and 
asserting  of  liberties  as  a  result  of  “inheritance  derived  to  [them]  from  [their]  forefathers,  and  to  be 
transmitted  to  [their]  posterity.”  While  the  idea  of  inheritance  does  contain  the  passing  of  material 
assets,  it  is  not  limited  to  this.  As  a  society,  we  inherit  laws  and  systems  of  governance,  which  for 
Burke,  represent  wisdom  that  is  cultivated  and  reflected  upon  from  every  generation  which  came 
before.  This  generational  connection  is  an  intimate  one  for  Burke  in  that  he  suggests  a  parallel 
between  ancestral  inheritance  and  national  inheritance.  The  laws  and  systems  come  to  exist  from  a 
shared  lineage  of  forefathers,  which  in  turn  creates  a  familial  connection  from  every  citizen  to 
England,  so  much  so  that  Burke  notes  England  to  be  an  “estate  specially  belonging  to  the  people  of 
this  kingdom.” 
While  Burke  identifies  this  claiming  of  estate  as  a  birthright,  we  must  also  point  out  the 
resonance  this  has  to  both  Marx  and  Wollstonecraft.  It  is  almost  as  if  Burke  does  not  consider  the 
total  implications  of  what  he  is  arguing.  By  specifically  stating  that  the  laws  of  England  were 
specially  drafted  by  England’s  forefathers,  and  thus  establishes  a  magical  and  respectable  bond 
from  the  citizens  to  their  country,  it  appears  rather  cosmetic.  When  considering  someone  who 
descends  from  an  ancestry  of  peasants  and  has  very  little,  it  is  superficial  to  ignore  this  aspect  and 
instead  glorify  the  fact  that  they  are  still  an  Englishman  or  Englishwoman.  It  is  also  rather  cruel  to 
then  pretend  that  they  have  equal  inheritance  to  the  estate  of  England.  While  this  is  a  problematic 
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consequence  of  Burke’s  ideology,  he  still  chooses  to  depend  on  inheritance,  which  is  in  part  a 
reflection  of  his  elitism,  but  also  largely  a  result  of  his  skepticism. 
As  noted  before,  inheritance  has  remained  the  “uniform  policy”  of  England  for  centuries,  as 
well  as  having  the  unique  capability  of  “preservi[ng]  a  unity  in  so  great  a  diversity”  of  the  parts  of 
their  constitution:  the  crown,  peerage,  House  of  Commons  as  well  as  the  differing  individual  levels 
of  inheritance.  As  such,  this  is  what  first  leads  Burke  to  believe  that  the  policy  is  “the  result  of 
profound  reflection.”  However,  Burke  then  corrects  himself,  and  writes  that  it  is  actually  not  just  a 
result  of  reflection,  but  that  it  is  “the  happy  effect  of  following  nature.”  This  immediate  change  of 
outlook  is  where  we  see  his  skeptical  attitude.  Inheritance  has  proven  itself  time  and  time  again  to 
be  the  necessary  component  of  political  stability.  So,  this  reflects  to  Burke  that  inheritance  is  a 
natural  order  and  one  that  can  and  should  be  depended  on. 
Due  to  this  assumption  of  certainty,  Burke  reasons  that  the  following  of  the  natural  order 
results  in  the  preservation  of  the  state:  
Our  political  system  is  placed  in  a  just  correspondence  and  symmetry  with  the  order 
of  the  world  and  with  the  mode  of  existence  decreed  to  a  permanent  body 
composed  of  transitory  parts,  wherein,  by  the  disposition  of  a  stupendous  wisdom, 
molding  together  the  great  mysterious  incorporation  of  the  human  race,  the  whole, 
at  one  time,  is  never  old  or  middle-aged  or  young,  but,  in  a  condition  of 
unchangeable  constancy,  moves  on  through  the  varied  tenor  of  perpetual  decay,  fall, 
renovation,  and  progression.  [...]  By  adhering  in  this  manner  and  on  those 
principles  to  our  forefathers,  we  are  guided  not  by  the  superstition  of  antiquarians, 
but  by  the  spirit  of  philosophic  analogy.   64
 
Inheritance  establishes  a  political  system  where  the  structure  itself  is  permanent,  but  those  who 
make  up  the  structure  differ.  This  political  system,  as  it  is  maintained  from  inheritance,  allows  for 
various  wisdoms  to  enact  upon  the  laws  themself,  as  well  as  allowing  for  these  laws  to  be 
64Burke,  Reflections,  30.  
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continually  incorporated  and  influenced  by  the  people  of  England.  In  this  way,  we  can  see  how 
inheritance  results  in  a  political  system  that  is  “of  unchangeable  constancy”  being  that  it  creates  a 
foundation  through  a  set  structure,  which  allows  for  specific  laws  to  go  through  “the  varied  tenor 
of  perpetual  decay,  fall,  renovation,  and  progression”  without  any  risk  to  the  state  itself.  Again  we 
see  that  Burke's  word  choice  of  “unchangeable  constancy”  also  reflects  the  certainty  he  prescribes 
to  anything  which  follows  from  the  natural  order.  It  is  not  enough  for  Burke  to  claim  that  the 
political  system  is  dependable,  he  takes  a  step  further  to  claim  that  this  dependability  is 
unwavering.  
We  also  see  in  this  passage  that  inheritance,  aside  from  establishing  a  necessary  foundation 
for  the  preservation  of  the  state,  also  serves  to  guide  the  present.  When  we  “adher[e]  in  this 
manner”  we  are  guided  “by  the  spirit  of  philosophical  analogy”  as  opposed  to  “the superstition  of 
antiquarians.”  For  Burke,  if  we  maintain  tradition,  we  are  able  to  use  analogy  to  compare  a  present 
situation  to  a  past  one  in  order  to  make  an  informed  decision.  But,  without  tradition,  we  are  left  to 
conceive  of  every  action,  law,  and  structure  as  the  result  of  something  unknowable  to  us,  thus 
requiring  our  blind  faith  or  “superstition.”  
Through  this  analysis,  an  interesting  paradox  emerges  from  Burke’s  skepticism.  On  the  one 
hand,  Burke  recognizes  that  the  world  around  him  is  constantly  changing,  and  thus  he  responds  by 
emphasizing  the  “unchangeable  constancy”  of  the  political  system  because  it  stems  from  an  already 
certain  natural  order.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  Burke  is  reluctant  to  conclude  that  any  decision,  aside 
from  the  maintenance  of  a  particular  political  structure,  can  be  certain.  Burke  recognizes  the  limits 
of  what  an  individual  can  know,  and  so  through  comparison,  we  are  able  to  make  informed 
decisions  based  on  history,  which  leaves  us  with  a  better  understanding  than  if  we  approached 
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decisions  in  a  vacuum.  While  the  former  still  reflects  a  dependability  that  can  and  should  go 
unquestioned,  the  latter  reflects  something  that  demands  questioning  and  comparison  in  order  to 
make  decisions.  With  this  understanding  of  what  is  driving  Burke’s  idea  of  inheritance,  we  can 
now  continue  to  see  how  this  manifests  in  a  political  ideology  that  is  against  revolution,  but  still 
prioritizes  reform. 
In  much  of Reflections  on  the  Revolution  in  France,  Burke  is  doing  comparative  work 
between  England's  history  and  the  beginning  of  France's  Revolution.  Burke  draws  on  two  critical 
periods  in  England's  history  -  the  Reformation  and  Revolution  -  when  England  was  without  a  king 
and  “had  lost  the  bond  of  union  to  their  ancient  edifice.”  However,  for  him,  what  separates 
England  from  France  is  that  England  did  not  “dissolve  the  whole  fabric”  of  the  constitution  but 
instead,  “regenerated  the  deficient  part  of  the  old  constitution  through  the  parts  which  were  not 
impaired”  whereas  France  has  done  the  opposite  and  is  attempting  to  organize  the  state  “by  the 
organic moleculae  of  a  disbanded  people.”  We  can  begin  to  see  that  for  Burke,  the  maintenance  65
of  inheritance  is  what  allows  for  reform,  not  the  destroying  of  it: 
Besides,  the  people  of  England  well  know  that  the  idea  of  inheritance  furnishes  a 
sure  principle  of  conservation  and  a  sure  principle  of  transmission,  without  at  all 
excluding  a  principle  of  improvement.  It  leaves  acquisition  free,  but  it  secures  what 
it  acquires.  Whatever  advantages  are  obtained  by  a  state  proceeding  on  these 
maxims  are  locked  fast  as  in  a  sort  of  family  settlement,  grasped  as  in  a  kind  of 
mortmain  forever.   66
 
Even  though  inheritance  can  be  perceived  as  establishing  a  fixed  system,  Burke  argues  that  it  does 
not  “exclud[e]  a  principle  of  improvement.”  He  claims  that  while  the  idea  of  inheritance  is  upheld, 
“acquisition  [is  left]  free”  so,  even  when  the  constitution  is  passed  down,  it  still  is  able  to  be 
65Burke,  Reflections,  19. 
66Burke,  Reflections,  29. 
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improved.  When  these  “advantages  are  obtained  by  a  state  proceeding  on  these  maxims”  they  are 
“locked  fast  as  in  a  sort  of  family  settlement,  grasped  as  in  a  kind  of  mortmain  forever.”  Even 
though  the  use  of  “in  a  kind  of  mortmain  forever”  again  reflects  the  idea  of  permanency,  Burke 
notes  that  reform  is  necessary.  Aside  from  already  claiming  that  England’s  constitution  had  to 
renew  its  “deficient”  parts,  he  also  points  out  that:  “A  state  without  the  means  of  some  change  is 
without  the  means  of  its  conservation.”  For  Burke,  inheritance  provides  necessary  grounding  67
through  the  maintenance  of  political  structure,  so  that  one  is  able  to  have  a  foundation  from  which 
they  can  not  only  receive  guidance  when  making  decisions,  but  also  have  stability  in  order  to 
explore  and  discover  how  to  improve  what  no  longer  serves  the  people.  As  such,  Burke’s  criticism 
of  the  French  Revolution  had  little  to  do  with  the  changes  they  wished  to  implement,  but  had 
everything  to  do  with  the  manner  in  which  it  was  done.  
During  the  early  days  of  the  French  Revolution,  King  Louis  XVI  called  a  meeting  of  the 
Estates-General,  which  was  a  representative  assembly  of  the  three  orders  of  France:  the  clergy 
(First  Estate),  the  nobility  (Second  Estate),  and  the  commoners  (Third  Estate).  Prior  to  this  meeting, 
the  representatives  from  each  order  wrote  down  a  list  of  grievances  to  bring  to  the  meeting  of  the 
Estates-General,  which  took  place  on  May  5th,  1789.  However,  during  the  meeting  the  orders 
were  immediately  divided  on  how  to  call  the  voting  system-either  by  head  count  or  by  estate. 
While  this  issue  occupied  the  estates  for  over  a  month,  on  June  17th  the  Third  Estate  decided  to 
break  off  and  form  the  National  Assembly,  which  threatened  to  proceed  with  or  without  the  other 
two  orders.  The  king  then  decided  to  lock  the  National  Assembly  out  of  their  meeting  hall  on  June 
20th,  so  the  National  Assembly  took  to  the  king’s  tennis  court  and  swore  they  would  not  leave 
67Burke,  Reflections,  19.  
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until  the  new  constitution  was  created.  This  protest  resulted  in  the  king  forcing  the  other  two  orders 
to  join,  forming  the  National  Constituent  Assembly.  While  the  intention  behind  the  formation  of  68
the  National  Constituent  Assembly  was  to  be  a  movement  towards  equality,  it  actually  resulted  in 
doing  everything  but  that:  
Believe  me,  sir,  those  who  attempt  to  level,  never  equalize.  In  all  societies, 
consisting  of  various  descriptions  of  citizens,  some  description  must  be  uppermost. 
The  levelers,  therefore,  only  change  and  pervert  the  natural  order  of  things;  they 
load  the  edifice  of  society  by  setting  up  in  the  air  what  the  solidity  of  the  structure 
requires  to  be  on  the  ground.  69
 
The  National  Constituent  Assembly,  as  it  was  led  by  the  Third  Estate,  just  simply  removed  the 
official  label  of  the  orders  and  thus  “confound[ed]  all  sorts  of  citizens,  as  well  as  they  could,  into 
one  homogeneous  mass.”  For  Burke,  this  was  unnatural  because  in  every  society,  there  is  70
diversity  among  its  citizens,  and  it  is  natural  that  some  citizens  will  have  an  objectively  more 
important  position  than  others;  at  some  point,  someone  has  to  make  the  final  decision.  So,  because 
the  Assembly  tried  to  ignore  this  reality  and  acted  as  if  every  citizen  was  the  same,  they  were  left 
with  a  complete  inability  to  understand  the  changes  France  needed;  they  throw  the  strongest  parts 
of  their  social  structures  into  the  air  when  in  reality,  they  are  required  to  be  on  the  ground.  
While  it  might  seem  that  Burke  is  again  playing  the laudator  temporis  acti in  order  to  fault 
any  change  that  does  not  coincide  with  his  certain  order,  what  Burke  really  is  concerned  about  is 
the  Assembly’s  assertion  of  certainty: 
They  have  some  change  in  the  church  or  state,  or  both,  constantly  in  their  view. 
When  that  is  the  case,  they  are  always  bad  citizens  and  perfectly  unsure 
connections.  For,  considering  their  speculative  designs  as  of  infinite  value,  and  the 
actual  arrangement  of  the  state  as  of  no  estimation,  they  are  at  best  indifferent  about 
68Editors  of  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  “French  Revolution,”  (Encyclopædia  Britannica,  inc:  March 
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it.  They  see  no  merit  in  the  good,  and  no  fault  in  the  vicious  management  of  public 
affairs;  they  rather  rejoice  in  the  latter,  as  more  propitious  to  revolution.  They  see  no 
merit  or  demerit  in  any  man,  or  any  action,  or  any  political  principle  any  further 
than  as  they  may  forward  or  retard  their  design  of  change;  they  therefore  take  up, 
one  day,  the  most  violent  and  stretched  prerogative,  and  another  time  the  wildest 
democratic  ideas  of  freedom,  and  pass  from  one  to  the  other  without  any  sort  of 
regard  to  cause,  to  person,  or  to  party.  71
 
For  Burke,  the  natural  order  is  undeniably  dependable  because  it  has  been  tested  and  proven  over 
time.  The  maintenance  of  this  natural  order  is  what  allows  for  laws  to  be  deliberated,  adjusted,  and 
implemented  by  the  “great  mysterious  incorporation  of  the  human  race.”  Therefore,  reform  is 
realizable  only  through  adhering  to  this  process  and  cannot  be  achieved  through  impulsivity.  So, 
being  that  the  Assembly  has  “constantly  in  their  view”  the  need  to  uproot  this  natural  order,  they 
are  regarded  as  “bad  citizens”  with  “perfectly  unsure  connections.”  While  this  claim  is  again 
reflective  of  his  own  skepticism  in  that  he  is  unwilling  to  accept  anything  that  deviates  from  what 
he  knows  to  be  true,  he  does  also  bring  attention  to  an  important  tension  between  the  potentiality 
and  the  actuality  of  ideas,  as  shown  in  “Rousseau's  Certainty:  Equality  in  Theory  and  Practice.”  
The  Assembly,  already  having  attempted  to  homogenize  its  citizens,  continues  to  consider 
their  “speculative  designs  [to  be  of]  infinite  value”  while  remaining  indifferent  to  the  “actual 
arrangement  of  the  state.”  They  are  so  certain  in  their  ideals  that  they  fail  to  see  the  “merit  or 
demerit”  of  any  man,  action  or  political  principle.  There  is  no  deliberation  for  they  only  consider 
something  long  enough  to  see  if  it  matches  or  goes  against  “their  design  of  change.”  The  Assembly 
asserts  certainty  on  the  basis  of  mere  speculation  without  any  grounding  in  reality,  and  this  is  what 
is  dangerous  for  Burke.  He  sees  no  contemplation,  no  moderation,  and  no  diversity  of  thought  - 
just  extremism  and  impulsivity,  the  result  of  which  is  political  and  social  catastrophe: 
71Burke,  Reflections,  56. 
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This  was  unnatural.  The  rest  is  in  order.  They  have  found  their  punishment  in  their 
success:  laws  overturned;  tribunals  subverted;  industry  without  vigor;  commerce 
expiring;  the  revenue  unpaid,  yet  the  people  impoverished;  a  church  pillaged,  and  a 
state  not  relieved;  civil  and  military  anarchy  made  the  constitution  of  the  kingdom; 
everything  human  and  divine  sacrificed  to  the  idol  of  public  credit,  and  national 
bankruptcy  the  consequence;  
 
The  Assembly,  because  they  acted  against  the  natural  order,  now  find,  as  if  it  is  a  logical 
consequence,  “their  punishment  in  their  success.”  By  overturning  laws,  they  did  away  with  the 
justice  process;  by  claiming  men  equal,  they  were  left  with  little  industry,  no  commerce,  and  still  no 
way  to  pay  for  public  expenses.  Churches  pillaged,  constitutions  destroyed,  everything  “human 
and  divine  sacrificed  to  the  idol  of  public  credit”  while  France  became  bankrupt  and  its  people 
remained  poor.   And  as  if  this  was  not  enough,   Burke  continues  with  the  following:  72
and,  to  crown  all,  the  paper  securities  of  new,  precarious,  tottering  power,  the 
discredited  paper  securities  of  impoverished  fraud  and  beggared  rapine,  held  out  as 
a  currency  for  the  support  of  an  empire  in  lieu  of  the  two  great  recognized  species 
that  represent  the  lasting,  conventional  credit  of  mankind,  which  disappeared  and 
hid  themselves  in  the  earth  from  whence  they  came,  when  the  principle  of  property, 
whose  creatures  and  representatives  they  are,  was  systematically  subverted.  73
 
The  Assembly  created  a  currency  that  was  backed  by  the  “impoverished  fraud  and  beggared 
rapine”  of  the  church  and  state,  which  already  “represented  the  lasting,  conventional  credit  of 
mankind.”  But  while  the  Assembly  handed  out  this  new  currency  and  framed  it  as  “support,”  they 
were  unable  to  see  the  damage  of  their  impulsivity.  From  this  moment  on,  the  very  things  which 
could  have  saved  France  from  ruin  “disappeared  and  hid  themselves  in  the  earth  from  whence  they 
came.”  Had  the  Assembly  relied  on  the  foundations  of  their  political  structure,  perhaps  they  would 
72There  is  an  interesting  comparison  to  be  made  to  Marx  and  his  views  on  capitalism.  The  fact  that 
“everything  human  and  divine”  can  be  reduced  to  a  credit  value  is  detestable  for  Burke.  However, 
being  that  Burke  was  an  aristocrat,  the  irony  should  not  be  lost  either.  
73Burke,  Reflections,  34. 
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have  achieved  the  reform  they  so  desperately  desired  but  instead,  they  dissolved  everything  and  as 
such,  were  left  only  able  to  conceive  of  ideals,  which  ultimately  destroyed  France  in  the  process.  
Through  this  brief  analysis  of  Burke,  we  are  able  to  see  that  his  skepticism  veers  toward  an 
anti-revolutionary  attitude.  However,  this  is  not  because  he  wants  to  protect  the  English  oligarchy 
nor  is  it  because  he  desires  to  maintain  oppression,  but  rather  because  he  thinks  that  immediate 
action  precludes  any  possibility  for  improvement.  As  shown  through  Burke's  account  of  the  French 
Revolution,  we  see  that  reform  needs  to  be  a  gradual  process  -  one  which  requires  the  foundations 
established  by  inheritance  to  be  maintained  in  order  to  be  leaned  on.  Without  these  foundations,  we 
are  guided  by  the  uncertainty  of  suspicion  and  speculation;  when  these  uncertainties  are  acted  on 
without  contemplation  and  deliberation,  we  find  ourselves  believing  we  have  made  progress,  but  as 
time  carries  on,  realize  we  have  actually  regressed.  
Perhaps  revolution  is  not  useful  toward  achieving  larger  goals  such  as  equality,  but  it  does 
allow  for  agency  and  grants  a  voice  to  those  who  have  not  been  heard.  Furthermore,  what  happens 
when  a  state  needs  to  be  structurally  changed  in  order  to  move  toward  an  ideal?  If  we  take 
inheritance  seriously,  this  appears  to  not  be  a  possibility  because  it  would  risk  the  collapse  of  the 
state  itself.  Burke  did  predict  the  outcome  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  so,  there  must  be  validity 
to  his  ideology;  yet  the  consequence  of  his  thinking  remains  a  question.  While  gradual  reform  is 
not  difficult  to  withstand  if  you  are  an  aristocrat,  it  means  something  entirely  different  to  those  who 
are  oppressed.  We  must  examine  under  what  terms  an  ideal  can  be  realized  and  at  one  point,  if  any, 
a  balance  can  be  struck  between  reform  and  revolution,  for  there  is  utility  in  both.  
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Conclusion 
 
The  relationship  between  skepticism  and  certainty  not  only  brought  attention  to  the 
complexity  of  these  thinkers  and  the  subtlety  of  their  political  positions,  but  it  also  complicated  how 
we  view  the  skeptical  narrative.  
Descartes’  method  propels  an  individual  to  question,  explore,  and  investigate  what  can  be 
certain,  but  the  expression  of  these  findings  are  limited.  The  moment  we  enter  into  society,  we  are 
expected  to  obey  laws,  custom,  and  authority  because  the  risk  of  dismantling  the  social  order  from 
the  assertion  of  false  certainty  overrides  the  value  of  voicing  any  new,  and  perhaps  uncertain,  ideas 
at  all.  The  tension  which  emerges  between  the  individual  and  the  collective,  as  a  result  of  the 
individual’s  skepticism,  directs  us  to  consider  a  wealth  of  questions:  Does  the  prosperity  of  the  state 
always  require  the  partial  elimination  of  individual  agency?  If  an  individual  is  expected  to  be 
politically  subservient,  what  is  the  utility  in  otherwise  maintaining  a  skeptical  attitude?  Does  the 
reserving  of  political  opinions  only  to  those  in  positions  of  power  override  the  equal  capacity  and 
right  to  reason  of  all  individuals?  
Rousseau’s  longing  for  transparency  as  a  way  to  reunite  and  equalize  individuals  is 
contradicted  throughout  his  own  demonstration.  In  order  for  transparency  to  be  realized,  citizens 
must  be  secretly  reconditioned  by  the  lawgiver  through  the  general  will.  Does  equality  need  to  be 
realized  through  blind  habituation?  The  lawgiver's  substantive  role  is  that  of  a  God  and,  as  such,  is 
granted  unchecked  and  unlimited  authority.  Why?  Because  this  lawgiver  is  assumed  to  know  how 
to  gear  citizens  toward  social  welfare.  Is  the  granting  of  absolute  power  dangerous?  Does  it 
inevitably  lead  to  political  certainty  and  is  such  certainty  even  possible?  While  Rousseau  maintains 
that  the  existence  of  the  lawgiver  is  conceivable,  what  emerges  from  his  work  is  the  impossibility 
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of  such  a  being.  This  tension  between  the  possibility  of  equality  and  the  actuality  of  establishing 
equality  as  demonstrated  through  the  role  of  the  lawgiver  leads  us  to  wonder  whether  such  ideals 
are  achievable.  Does  the  fictitious  nature  of  the  lawgiver  suggest  that  equality  in  society  is  also 
mere  fiction?  
Burke’s  skepticism  leads  him,  unlike  Rousseau,  to  prioritize  the  actual  and  historical  above 
the  theoretical  or  ideal.  As  a  result,  he  concludes  that  inheritance  is  a  natural  and  sure  principle 
because  it  has  withstood  the  test  of  time.  Inheritance  is  not  only  about  unchanging  constancy,  but 
every  social  and  political  structure  which  stems  from  it  serves  as  a  foundation  that  should  be  leaned 
on  during  the  inevitable  unpredictability  of  change.  But,  we  are  left  to  ask:  At  what  point  does  an 
assertion  of  certainty  become  one  of  compliance?  Not  only  do  inherited  customs  guide  us,  but  they 
also  ground  us  in  our  political  and  social  realities  so  that  when  we  make  decisions,  we  act  not  from 
the  impulsivity  of  our  ideals,  but  from  a  deep  relationship  with  our  personal  and  communal  reality. 
The  question  remains:  Can  reality  ever  be  a  certainty?  What  is  it  about  an  ideal  that  makes  it 
inevitably  uncertain?  From  this  uncertainty,  it  is  not  surprising  that  to  Burke,  reform  cannot  be 
realized  through  revolutions,  but  only  through  the  very  maintenance  of  well-worn  political 
structures.  If  this  is  the  case,  what  happens  to  those  ideals  that  require  the  rearrangement  of 
particular  political  structures?  Are  some  ideals  more  unattainable  than  others?  
By  investigating  the  relationship  between  skepticism  and  certainty  in  the  work  of 
Descartes,  Rousseau,  and  Burke,  we  have  found  that  our  understanding  of  these  thinkers  and  their 
politics  has  been  complex,  ultimately  reflecting  the  larger  question  of  the  limits  of  certainty.  The 
question  of  certitude  is  one  that  cuts  across  time,  space,  and  politics.  It  continues  to  emerge  and 
manifest  itself  in  new  ways,  that  not  only  speak  to  the  centrality  of  the  question  for  the  history  of 
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political  thought,  but  also  to  the  responsibility  we  share  in  seeking  an  answer.  Whether  or  not  we 
will  ever  discover  the  answer,  the  point  is  that  we  dared  to  try. 
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